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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
T h i s c o u r t h a s j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r t h i s a p p e a l p u r s u a n t t o Utah Code 
Ann. 78-2a-3(2) ( j ) (1988). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t a b u s e d i t s d i s c r e t i o n i n a d m i t t i n g i n t o 
e v i d e n c e t h e t e s t i m o n y of Rebecca Helms and J o d y C h r i s t e n s e n t h a t : 
a. They h a d f a l l e n i n Wasatch Manor p a r k i n g l o t , and 
b. They h a d t o l d an employee of Wasatch Manor t h a t t h e y h a d f a l l e n . 
2. Whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t committed r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r by g i v i n g J u r y 
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 20? 
3. Whethe r t h e t r i a l c o u r t committed r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r by d e n y i n g 
Wasatch Manor 's Motion f o r a New T r i a l ? 
4. Whethe r t h i s a p p e a l i s f r i v o l o u s and t a k e n f o r d e l a y , t h u s e n t i t l i n g 
E r i c k s o n t o a t t o r n e y s f e e s and s a n c t i o n s ? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, ETC. 
Utah R u l e s of E v i d e n c e , Rule 103. R u l i n g s on e v i d e n c e . 
(a) Ef fec t of e r r o n e o u s r u l i n g . E r r o r may n o t be p r e d i c a t e d u p o n a 
r u l i n g wh ich admi t s o r e x c l u d e s e v i d e n c e u n l e s s a s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t of t h e 
p a r t y i s a f f e c t e d , and 
(1) Ob jec t ion . In c a s e t h e r u l i n g i s one a d m i t t i n g e v i d e n c e , a 
t i m e l y o b j e c t i o n o r mot ion t o s t r i k e a p p e a r s of r e c o r d , s t a t i n g t h e 
s p e c i f i c g r o u n d of o b j e c t i o n , i f t h e s p e c i f i c g r o u n d was n o t 
a p p a r e n t from t h e c o n t e x t . . . . 
* * * 
(d) P l a i n e r r o r . N o t h i n g i n t h i s r u l e p r e c l u d e s t a k i n g n o t i c e of p l a i n 
e r r o r s a f f e c t i n g s u b s t a n t i a l r i g h t s a l t h o u g h t h e y w e r e n o t b r o u g h t t o t h e 
a t t e n t i o n of t h e c o u r t . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Wasatch Manor i s a n a p a r t m e n t b u i l d i n g f o r e l d e r l y , h a n d i c a p p e d a n d 
d i s a b l e d i n d i v i d u a l s wh ich i s l o c a t e d a t 535 South 200 Eas t , S a l t Lake Ci ty , 
Utah. (R. 446 a t 5,6). The Manor h a s 234 r e s i d e n t s . The a v e r a g e a g e of 
t h e r e s i d e n t s a t Wasatch Manor i s i n t h e low e i g h t i e s (Id. a t 8). A t t r i a l , 
Wasatch Manor p e r s o n n e l acknowledged t h a t b e c a u s e of t h e a g e a n d 
i n f i r m i t i e s of t h e i r t e n a n t s , i t was t h e i r d u t y t o be more c a r e f u l t h a n o t h e r 
l a n d l o r d s i n c l e a r i n g snow and m e l t i n g b l a c k i c e . (R 446 a t 14, 49). 
At t r i a l t h e P l a i n t i f f , Guy E r i c k s o n , u r g e d t h a t t h e way i n w h i c h 
Wasatch Manor p i l e d snow on t h e u p p e r l e v e l of t h e p a r k i n g l o t b e h i n d i t s 
b u i l d i n g c r e a t e d a d a n g e r o u s c o n d i t i o n f o r t e n a n t s and t h a t E r i c k s o n f e l l 
a n d s u s t a i n e d o r g a n i c b r a i n damage a s a r e s u l t of Wasa tch ' s n e g l i g e n t 
f a i l u r e t o c u r e t h e d a n g e r o u s c o n d i t i o n . (R. 445 a t 12, 13). 
The u p p e r l e v e l of t h e p a r k i n g l o t h a s a v e r y g r a d u a l , a l m o s t 
i m p e r c e i v a b l e g r a d e wh ich d e s c e n d s t o a low p o i n t . The low p o i n t r u n s 
from n o r t h t o s o u t h a b o u t 25 f e e t from t h e w e s t e r n edge of t h e l o t , t h e 
edge c l o s e s t t o t h e b u i l d i n g . (R. 446 a t 9, 10, 32, T r i a l E x h i b i t s #1 a n d 
#3). T h i s l o w e s t a r e a i s sometimes r e f e r r e d t o a s t h e " d e p r e s s i o n " 
t h r o u g h o u t t h e t r i a l , a l t h o u g h i t i s s imply t h e l o w e s t p o i n t of t h e g r a d e i n 
t h e l o t . T h e r e a r e no d r a i n s i n t h e l o t and a l l m o i s t u r e m u s t r u n down t h e 
s o u t h w e s t ramp. (Id. a t 10, 32, 33). 
At t h e t ime of Mr. E r i c k s o n 1 s f a l l , a m a j o r i t y of t h e p a r k i n g s t a l l s on 
t h e u p p e r l e v e l of t h e p a r k i n g l o t we re l e a s e d t o S a l t Lake Coun ty f o r t h e 
c a r s of employees who w o r k e d i n t h e Ci ty and County Bu i ld ing . However , 
mos t of t h e p a r k i n g p l a c e s a l o n g t h e w e s t row of t h e l o t a r e p o s t e d f o r 
g u e s t s and t e n a n t s . (Id. a t 13). 
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People who parked the i r cars in the guest or vis i tor parking (the west 
row) would, of necessity, need to walk through the depressed area in order 
to enter the building. The entry to the building i s in the center of the 
row of parking places along the west side of the parking lot. (Id. a t 11, P 
Exhibit #1 and #3). 
Wasatch Manor closed off the lower level of parking at 11:00 p.m. 
each night with large locked gates in order to prevent vandalism. (Id. at 
28 ). Any tenant who has a reserved parking place on the lower level, 
who ar r ives after 11:00 p.m. must park in the guest and tenant parking on 
the upper level and must therefore t raverse the "depressed" area to gain 
access to the building. (Id. at 28, 29). 
Wasatch pi les snow around the perimeter of the lot during the winter 
and continued th i s pract ice through the winter of 1984-85. (Id. a t 9 and 
P. Exhibit #1). When the temperature ra ises above freezing, the piled snow 
melts, sending sheets of water slowly across the lot to the depression. 
When the temperature lowers below freezing, the water turns to thin sheets 
of clear ice (black ice). At t r i a l , Wasatch Manor's manager, Mr. Miller and 
building engineer, Mr. Kersey, acknowledged that th i s condition existed 
during the winter of 1984-85, that they were aware of it , and tha t if left 
untreated i t would create a dangerous condition. (Id. at 8, 14, 15, 42, ) 
J u s t such a thaw-freeze cycle occurred the day pr ior to the night of 
February 9, 1985, when Erickson fell. (Id. at 24, 25, 27, 28 and Trial 
Exhibit P #18). At the time, the Plaintiff, Guy Erickson was 66 years old 
and was a tenant of Wasatch Manor. He had a reserved, covered, parking 
space on the lower level of the parking lot. At t r i a l , he test if ied tha t on 
the night of February 9, 1985, he arrived at the manor at about 11:15 p.m. 
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and found the lower level gates closed and locked. He drove to the upper 
level and parked in the v is i tor and tenant parking. Mr. Erickson fell on 
black ice in the depressed area as he was walking to the apartment, h i t t ing 
his head. (R. 446 at 145). As a r e su l t of his fall, Mr. Erickson, developed 
two subdural hematomas which required surgery to co r r ec t (R. 446 at 149, 
150). Expert testimony at t r i a l showed that he suffered permanent organic 
brain damage, including a loss of 70-80% of his short term memory and a 
loss of other important mental abi l i t ies . (R. 446 at 151). 
Mr. Erickson had been a successful realtor. Business associates who 
had worked with him before and after the fall, indicated tha t he was 
capable before the fall. (R. 446 at 143, 144). After the fall they referred 
to him as senile, incompetent and an embarrassment. (R. 446 at 147, 148). 
Two witnesses, a re la t ive and a friend of Mr. Erickson's, test if ied of 
changes in his personality where he became less patient, more i r r i t ab le , less 
affable and lacking his old sense of humor. (R. 446 at 147, 148). Mr. 
Erickson and a friend testif ied of his inabili ty to play his lifelong loves of 
golf and tennis . (R. 446 at 147, 158, 159). 
Wasatch Manor's defense to Erickson's negligence claim was tha t i t 
had taken reasonable efforts to observe when ice existed on the upper level 
of the parking lo t and had treated i t by looking for any ice at l eas t three 
times a day and salt ing the ice. Wasatch's system of looking for ice and 
salt ing i t three times a day was claimed by Wasatch's personnel to be a 
regular "routine" which they did every day without fail. (R. 445 at 24-27). 
Most of the l a s t day of t r i a l was spent in determining the extent or 
validity of Wasatch's claimed "routine." Mr. Art Kersey i s the building 
engineer for Wasatch Manor. Erickson called him as a witness on the l a s t 
4 
day of t r a i l . He test if ied tha t he was in charge of snow and ice removal 
from the common ways and parking lot for Wasatch Manor during the 
winter of 1984-85. (Id. at 15). 
Mr. Kersey test if ied that he could not remember the specific 
conditions of the night of February 9, 1985 nor could he remember his 
specific actions tha t night. (Id. at 26, 35, 50, 138). He could remember 
doing his "routine" on the night of February 9, 1985. (Id. a t 34, 35, 137, 
138). He test i f ied tha t he performed a "regular routine" for snow and ice 
treatment every day of the winter of 1984-85. (R. 446 at 36). 
Mr. Kersey claimed that his regular routine began f i r s t thing in the 
morning at 6:30 a.m. when he would check the walkways and the parking 
lot for snow or ice. If i t had snowed during the night, he would call a 
private company who would remove the snow. If patches of ice were 
present, he test if ied tha t he would f i l l a bucket with ice-melt or sal t and 
t r ea t the ice patches. If ice covered the whole lot, he claimed he would 
take a fe r t i l i zer spreader and load i t with sal t and spread i t over the whole 
lot. (Id. at 37, 38, 48) 
He claimed tha t his specific purpose for being out on the lo t at 6:30 
a.m. was to make sure the lot was cleared and de-iced before the county 
employees arr ived to park on the upper level in the morning. (Id. at 48) 
The second par t of Mr. Kersey's daily routine was to go out to the 
parking lo t "right at knocking off time" at 5:00 p.m. He claimed tha t he 
repeated the same steps of clearing any accumulated snow and observing 
and t reat ing any ice tha t was present. (Id. at 38, 39). 
The th i rd pa r t of Mr. Kersey's daily routine was to go to the lower 
lo t at 11:00 p.m. and lock the gates to the lower parking level. He 
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test if ied tha t immediately after locking the gates he went to the upper lo t 
and repeated the same routine of clearing any accumulated snow and 
observing and t rea t ing any ice with de-ice or sal t (Id. at 40) 
Mr. Kersey claimed tha t as a general rule, ice was not present on the 
upper lot because of his daily routine. (Id. at 43, 139). He 
pointed out tha t he cared for the residents of Wasatch Manor and claimed 
tha t he wanted to make sure the lot was safe for them. (Id. a t 41, 42). 
Mr. Kersey claimed tha t no one had told him tha t they had fallen in 
the parking lo t during the 1984-85 winter. (Id. at 44, 139). He claimed 
tha t no one had complained about the ice tha t winter. (Id. a t 44). He 
claimed that no one had told him tha t the lo t needed salting. (Id. at 45). 
Mr. Kersey claimed tha t he was so conscientious about snow and ice 
removal that he not only cleared the parking lot but also cleared the 
sidewalk along Second East, "all the way to 6th South and a l l the way to 
4th South, which i s one whole block." This sidewalk was in front of a 
"beer joint" and some other buildings. (R. 446 at 46). 
Mr. Kersey claimed that, "the county complemented us on what a good 
job we did in keeping the walkways and ramps clear." When asked who in 
the county complimented him about the lot he responded, "Oh, I wish I had 
kept names in the journal. But as people pass by they said, What a fine 
job you are doing. This parking lot i s the best in town. . ." (Id. a t 48). 
Mr. Miller, Wasatch Manor's manager, claimed tha t substantial 
quanti t ies of sa l t were purchased to accommodate the extensive salt ing of 
Mr. Kersey over such a large parking lot and walk ways. (Id. a t 22, 23). 
He admitted, however, tha t notwithstanding Erickson's repeated requests for 
production of documents, he could not find a canceled check, a rece ip t or 
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document, evidencing tha t any sal t or de-icer had been purchased for the 
1984-85 winter. (Id. a t 17, 18). 
After Mr. Kersey and Mr. Miller testified about the condition of the 
lo t during 1984-85, Erickson called Rebecca Helms to testify. Mrs. Helms 
worked for the Tax Abatement Office of Salt Lake County at the City and 
County building during the winter of 1984-85. (Id. at 57 ). She parked 
every working day on the upper level of the parking lot a t Wasatch Manor 
during the winter of 1984-85. (Id. at 58, 59 ). 
Mrs. Helms arr ived at her parking place at approximately 7:45 a.m. 
On her way to work she walked over the general area where Erickson fell. 
When returning to her car at approximately 5:00 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. she again 
went over the general area where Erickson fell. (Id. at 59, 60). The times 
tha t she was present in the parking lot each day were immediately after 
the times of day tha t Mr. Kersey claimed that he salted the lot as a pa r t 
of his daily routine. 
She indicated tha t regarding the winter of 1984-85, "Quite frequently 
there was ice on the parking lot. There was a sheet of ice, black ice, if 
we had a bad storm in the morning when I got there." (Id. a t 60 ). At 
page 61 of the t r i a l t r ansc r ip t (R. 446) the dialogue with Mrs. Helms states: 
Q. Now, was there ice in th is depressed area as a general rule 
during the winter? 
A. Yes, there was. 
She test if ied tha t she did observe salting of the ice down one of the 
ramps during the winter of 1984-85. However, she indicated tha t she did 
not see sal t anywhere else in the lot, including the depressed areas, during 
tha t winter. (Id. a t 60, 61, 62, 81). She indicated tha t the sidewalk in 
front of Junior 's Bar, from Wasatch Manor to fifth south was never 
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shoveled dur ing t h e win te r of 1984-85. (Id. a t 61, 62 ). 
During Mr. Kersey 's test imony he ident i f ied himself as t h e Wasatch 
Manor employee who r a i s e d and lowered a l a rge garbage con t a ine r from t h e 
lower pa rk ing l e v e l t o t h e upper l e v e l every day dur ing t h e win te r of 1984-
85. (Id. a t 43, 44). At t r i a l , Mrs. Helms testimony was as follows: 
Q. Did you eve r t a l k with anybody a t Wasatch Manor about t h e 
condit ion in t h e p a r k i n g lot? 
A. There was a gentleman who used to r a i s e and lower t h e 
garbage can every morning. And he most always was t h e r e when I 
came. And a f t e r I had fa l len t h a t one day, I did say t o him they 
needed to ge t something on t h e lot . That i t was very , ve ry 
t r e a c h e r o u s . 
(R. 446 a t 62). 
Mrs. Helms went on t o ident i fy t he garbage man as Mr. Kersey in 
open cou r t and ind ica t ed t h a t t he conversa t ion occur red some time du r ing 
t h e months of December 1984, J a nua ry or February 1985. (Id. a t 62, 63). 
Besides d i r e c t r e b u t t a l test imony to Mr. Kersey's claim t h a t no one had said 
t o him t h e l o t was i cy or needed sa l t ing , t h i s dialogue was a l so t h e f i r s t 
r e f e r ence made by Mrs. Helms to a f a l l she suffered in t h e l o t Mr. Hayes 
did not object t o Mrs. Helms comment about he r fa l l or move to s t r i k e i t . 
(Id. a t 64). 
As p a r t of l ay ing foundation for the conversa t ion with Kersey, Mr. 
Bjorklund did no t go i n t o a de ta i l ed examination of Mrs. Helms f a l l bu t 
only asked t h e most bas ic of foundat ional ques t ions about h e r fa l l : 
Q. So you t a lked with him some time in which month would you 
say? 
A. I can't recaLL I t had to be December, January or February. 
Q. Of t h e win ter of 1984 and 1985? 
A. Yes. But t o spec i f i ca l ly say what day i t was - - I f e l l 
probably c l o s e r t o February, I would say. 
Q. Now, on t h e day you fe l l , what were you doing t h a t day? 
A. Going to work? 
Q. Would you t e l l us where you parked on this par t icular day? 
A. Right he re , in my p a r k i n g place. 
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Q. Okay. 
A. And I f e l l r i g h t behind my automobile. Right t h e r e on t h a t 
corner . 
Q. That was in t h a t depressed area , wasn't i t ? 
A. R igh t Because t he p a r k i n g p lace kind of went up. 
Q. And i t was sho r t l y a f te r t h a t you told Mr. Kersey t h a t he 
needed to get s a l t in t h e area? 
A. R igh t 
(Id. a t 64). Mr. Hayes did no t object to any of Mr. Bjorklund's q u e s t i o n s 
r ega rd ing he r f a l l nor did he move to s t r i k e any of Mrs. Helm's answers . 
Upon c ros s examination Mr. Hayes reviewed Mrs. Helms f a l l i n 
cons iderable de t a i l . (Id. a t 70-76). During Mr. Hayes' c ro s s examination 
Mrs. Helms t e s t i f i e d t h a t she had a lso to ld Mr. Kersey about he r f a l l dur ing 
t h e winter of 1984-85. (Id. a t 73, 74). 
Erickson then ca l l ed Mrs. Jody Chr is tensen as a wi tness . She worked 
for the County Assessor ' s Office dur ing the winter of 1984-85 and parked 
on the upper l e v e l of Wasatch Manor's pa rk ing l o t dur ing t h a t time. (Id. a t 
83). She parked in t h e l o t two to four times a week and t r a v e r s e d over 
t h e genera l a rea where Erickson fe l l in the morning before 8:00 a.m. and in 
t h e evening a f t e r 5:00 p.m. (Id. a t 83-86). 
When asked about t h e condit ion of the l o t dur ing the winter of 1984-
85 she responded a t page 88 of t h e t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t (R. 446): 
A. Very dangerous , I thought within myself. I t had black i c e on 
black ice . Sometimes you could ac tua l ly see where i t had melted and 
refrozen. 
Q. You mean l a y e r upon l aye r? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And du r ing t h a t winter , had you had occasion t o observe 
whether or no t t h e r e was s a l t spread on t h a t pa rk ing lo t? 
A. Very few times. 
Q. So you did see some sa l t? 
A. Uh-hum. 
Q. Very few times. When you say very few times, can you give 
an est imate of how many times over the course of t h e win te r you saw 
s a l t in t h e pa rk ing lo t? 
A. I would est imate — now, a r e you speaking of every winter , or 
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Q. No. Jus t the winter of 1984/'85. 
A. I would say maybe two or three. 
She indicated tha t she had to hold onto the back of cars to negotiate 
the lot. (Id. at 84, ). Mrs. Christensen test if ied tha t at times the 
walkway in front of Junior 's Bar (along Second East to 5th South) was 
passable but at times i t was worse on the sidewalk than on the s t r ee t so 
they would walk in the s t r e e t (Id. at 91). 
As Mr. Bjorklund asked Mrs. Christensen about the route she walked 
every morning in the parking lot, she volunteered that her route changed 
after she had fallen in the parking lot. Mr. Hayes did not object or move 
to s t r ike her reference to a fall. (Id. at 84). 
She indicated tha t she had told Mr. Kersey that she had fallen, when 
she asked him if she could walk through the foyer. (Id. at 89, 90, 99, 103). 
In open court, she identified Mr. Kersey as the man she had talked to 
about using the foyer and her fall. (Id. at 89). 
Mr. Bjorklund asked only foundational question about where she fell, 
when she fell, the condition of the lo t and the weathei: at the time. (Id. 
a t 87, 88). Mr. Hayes did not object to any of Mr. Bjorklund's questions, 
nor did he move to s t r ike any of her answers regarding her fall. 
During Mr. Hayes's cross-examination he examined Mrs. Christensen in 
substantial detail regarding her fall and her memory. (Id. at 92-105). In 
response to one of Mir. Hayes' questions, she commented, "I was petr if ied of 
t ha t parking lot. In my estimation and my opinion and in my belief, I 
think i t ' s a death trap." (Id. at 101). 
Erickson then called Mrs. Colleen Mark as a witness. She worked at 
the City - County Building during the year of 1984-85 in the Treasurer 's 
Office and walked to and from work along the same general area of Mr. 
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Erickson's fall jus t before 8:00 a.m. and jus t after 5:00 p.m. on a nearly 
daily basis. (Id. a t 105-107). 
At 107 and 108 of the t r a i l t ranscr ip t (R. 446) her testimony reads in 
per t inent part: 
Q. And during tha t winter, did you have a chance to observe the 
occurrence of ice in tha t parking lot? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And how often was i t icy? 
A. Whenever i t froze. 
Q. And how often was that, once in the winter? 
A. No. Two or three times, I'd say, a month, if i t really got cold 
and frozen. 
Q. All r i g h t Did you have a chance to observe whether or not 
there was sa l t in the parking lot during the winter? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And how often did you see salt? 
A. I didn't see any sal t at a l l unt i l the winter we left there, the 
winter before we left there. And we left there in December of '86. 
Mr. Bjorklund did not ask Mrs. Mark any questions about a fall and 
Mrs. Mark did not mention a fall in any of her answers during d i rec t 
examination. (Id. a t 105-108). 
Incredibly, upon cross-examination, Mr. Hayes elicited from Mrs. Mark 
substantial detai l about a fall she had in the Wasatch Manor parking lot, 
even though i t had not been raised during her d i rect examination. (Id. at 
108-112). Indeed, at one point she offered that, "Several people in my 
office have fallen, but they weren't injured. I was injured." (Id. a t 112). 
Mr. Hayes did not move to s t r ike this comment nor did he move to s t r ike 
any of her comments about her fall. 
After Mrs. Mark, Erickson rested i t s presentation of the case. 
Wasatch called Mr. Miller, the manager of Wasatch Manor as i t s f i r s t 
witness. Mr. Hayes asked him to comment on the l a s t three witnesses who 
had test if ied tha t the lo t "was nothing but a sheet of ice two or three 
times a month." (Id. 125). Miller claimed he would have seen the ice and 
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t h a t he was "abso lu te ly su re " no i c e had b u i l t up. (Id. 125). 
Mr. Miller t e s t i f i e d t h a t when Mr. Erickson had app l i ed for an 
apartment a t Wasatch Manor t h a t Miller had t a lked with him. (Id. 124). 
Miller t e s t i f i ed t h a t i n t h a t in te rv iew, Erickson ind ica ted t o Mil ler t h a t he 
was in " re t i rement s t a t u s . " This s tatement would have c o n t r a d i c t e d major 
p a r t s of the f i r s t two days of t r i a l , where Erickson i n d i c a t e d he did no t 
p lan to r e t i r e a t t h e t ime of h i s fa l l . Mr. Miller 's s ta tement could have 
se r ious ly drawn i n t o q u e s t i o n Erickson 's c red ib i l i t y . Upon c r o s s 
examination, in a r a t h e r dramatic exchange of ques t ions and answers , Mr. 
Miller admitted t h a t Er ickson had no t to ld him he was r e t i r i n g . (Id. 133). 
The ju ry found t h a t Wasatch Manor was neg l igen t in f a i l i n g t o t r e a t a 
dangerous condi t ion which was t he proximate cause of Er ickson ' s i n j u r i e s 
and granted Er ickson a judgement of $9,820 for medical damages, $45,000 
l o s s of income and $30,000 in gene ra l damages, for a t o t a l judgment of 
$84,820.15. (R. 446 a t 203). 
PRE-TRIAL FACTS 
In r e sponse t o Wasatch's d i scovery r e q u e s t s of Er ickson in 1987, two 
y e a r s before t r i a l , E r ickson had l i s t e d the names of four women who, i t 
was bel ieved, had f a l l e n i n t h e Wasatch Manor pa rk ing lot : Rebecca Helms, 
Jody Chr i s tensen , Colleen Mark and Carol Beck. (Appendix A). The t r i a l 
test imony of t h e f i r s t t h r e e of t h e s e women i s reviewed above. Mrs. Beck 
did not t e s t i f y a t t r i a l even though Wasatch subpoenaed he r , conferenced 
with he r and had h e r wai t in t h e h a l l the l a s t day of t r i a l . (R. 3 97). 
Mr. Hayes subpoenaed a l l of t h e s e l ad ies to depos i t ions in October of 
1987. (R. 438, 439, 441). Ne i the r Mr. Bjorklund or Mr. Hayes had t a l k e d 
t o t h e s e women before t h e y appeared for t h e i r deposi t ion. The w i t n e s s e s 
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were unprepared with regard to the subject matter and detai l sought during 
the deposition. (R. 395; R. 444 at 16). 
Colleen Mark indicated in her deposition testimony tha t the parking 
lot had no drainage (R. 439 a t 7), tha t "there was ice in tha t parking lo t 
at a l l times" (Id. a t 9), t h a t the condition of the parking lo t was "a general 
joke" in the County offices, (Id. a t 11), tha t the parking lot was "a t e r r ib l e 
place" (Id. at 11) and tha t she never saw any sal t in the parking lo t during 
the 1984-85 winter (Id. a t 17). Mrs. Mark identified tha t she had fallen in 
the parking lot in November of 1984, 2-3 months before Mr. Erickson's fall. 
(Id. a t 15). 
Jody Christensen indicated in her deposition testimony tha t she was 
"petrified of the parking lot" (R. 438 at 15), tha t the sun would melt the 
piled snow and i t would turn to a sheet of ice (Id. at 17), tha t she had 
often referred to the parking lot as a "death trap" (Id. at 17), t ha t no one 
liked to park in the lo t because i t was icy (Id. at 18) and tha t sa l t was 
only occasionally presen t (Id. a t 17). 
Mrs. Christensen indicated in her deposition testimony tha t she had 
fallen in the parking lo t twice. Between 1984 and 1985 she fell in the 
parking lot behind the cars on the west row, near where the parking lo t 
enters to the doors of the building (in the area of the depression). (Id. at 
8, 9 and see footnote 2). 
At page 11 of her deposition (R. 438) Mr. Hayes asked her: 
Q Did you report it to anyone? 
A. I probably made comment that I had fallen? 
Q. To someone at work? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you report it to anybody at Wasatch Manor? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever have any dealings with anyone at Wasatch manor 
regarding paying for parking or the condition of the parking lot or 
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anyth ing l i k e t ha t ? 
A. I know t h a t I t a lked t o t h e manager t h e r e and asked him if I 
could walk th rough t h e lobby and not walk down the ramp, t h a t I was 
pe t r i f i ed of t h e ramp, and he sa id t h a t I could. 
Emphasis Added. 
Rebecca Helms t e s t i f i e d a t h e r depos i t ion t h a t she f e l t t h a t Wasatch 
Manor "should have done something", t h a t t he pa rk ing l o t he ld water and 
would t u r n to i ce (R. 441 a t 22), t h a t i t was common to see i c e on the l o t 
dur ing t h e winter (Id. a t 26), t h a t water would hang around t h e dep re s s ion 
a r ea and i t was i cy t h e r e (Id. a t 27), t h a t i t was t y p i c a l t o f ind black i ce 
in t h a t a rea ((Id. a t 27, 29), t h a t t h e pa rk ing l o t had a r e p u t a t i o n for be ing 
ve ry i cy (Id. a t 30), and t h a t s a l t was used on the l o t " spa rse ly" du r ing 
t h e 1984-85 winter . (Id. a t 29, 31). 
Mrs. Helms ind ica ted t h a t she had fa l len s eve ra l times in t h e lot . (Id. 
a t 9). She i n i t i a l l y ind ica ted she could not remember when she fe l l . 
However, when Mr. Hayes suggested i t was 1986, she ind ica ted she f e l l in 
1986. (Id. a t 9 - l i n e s 20, 22 and 25). The f a l l occur red in t h e dep re s sed 
area , behind h e r ca r t h a t was pa rked along the west edge of t h e lo t . (Id. 
a t 11, 27, 28 and see Footnote 2). At page 12 of he r depos i t ion t r a n s c r i p t 
(R. 441) Mr Hayes asked: 
Q. Did you r e p o r t t h i s to anybody? 
A. I k ind of t h ink t h a t I did r e p o r t i t t o the office bu t I don ' t t h i n k 
a n
 i n d u s t r i a l was made up on i t . I went on to work. 
Q. When you say t h e office, your office, the Assessor ' s Office? 
A. Right t h e Assesso r ' s Office. 
Q. Did you r e p o r t i t t o anybody a t Wasatch Manor? 
A. No. 
Emphasis Added. 
Mrs. Helms had fa l len ano ther time, within e igh t y e a r s of t h e 
depos i t ion . (Id. a t 14). This f a l l occurred , "fur ther nor th r i g h t before I 
went to go down t h e ramp." (Id. a t 14). Mr. Hayes asked: 
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Q. And did you r e p o r t t h a t i n c i d e n t t o anybody? 
A. I don' t remember. Probably not- I don' t know. 
Q. And did you r e p o r t i t t o anybody a t Wasatch Manor? 
A. No. 
Q. To pa rk t h e r e a t t h a t pe r iod of time did you have to 
come th rough a gate where someone was monitoring people 
coming in and out? 
A. Never did we do t h a t in the 20 y e a r s t h a t I was t h e r e . 
Occasionally t h e r e would be a man t h e r e t h a t would lower t h e 
garbage down eve ry day. Sometimes I'd see him t h e r e , and I 
f igured he was from t h e manor and I spoke to him, bu t nobody 
ever monitored us t h a t I was aware of. 
Q, You n e v e r t a l k e d to anybody about t h e condi t ion of t h e 
pa rk ing lot? 
A. I can remember t e l l i n g them I thought they ought t o p u t 
some i ce down bu t I don' t know who I t a lked to or which day 
i t was. 
MR. BJORKLUND: You j u s t said you thought they ought to 
p u t some i ce down. 
THE WITNESS: I mean some s a l t down. 
Q. (By Mr. Hayes) When did you do t h a t and t o whom? 
A. I don' t know t o whom or which days because I would see 
t h i s man ou t t h e r e lowering the garbage. There 's a big garbage 
t h ing t h a t t hey lowered up and down. I t h ink they p u t i t up so 
the people could b r i n g t h e i r garbage out every day. Then t h e 
r e s t of t he day i t was lowered down in to park t h e r e . 
Q. What was h i s r e s p o n s e to you? 
A. I can ' t remember t h a t t h e r e was one. I commented on 
the i ce to him a time o r two, I know tha t . 
(R. 441 a t 16). 
On February 1, 1989, Er ickson f i led Supplemental Answers t o 
I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s i n d i c a t i n g which add i t iona l wi tnesses he p lanned t o c a l l a t 
t r i a l . Colleen Mark, Jody Chr i s tensen , Rebecca Helms, Carol Beck, Burton 
Miller and Art Kersey were each l i s t ed . (R. 52, 53, Appendix B). Er ickson 
noted e x p l i c i t l y t h a t t h e l a d i e s would t e s t i f y "of t he gene ra l condi t ion of 
t h e Wasatch Manor p a r k i n g t e r r a c e " and the Wasatch p e r s o n n e l would be 
asked to t e s t i f y r e g a r d i n g t h e p o l i c i e s and conduct of Wasatch Manor. (R. 
52, 53, Appendix B). 
On Apr i l 3, 1989, Mr. Hayes f i led a Motion in Limine with t h e t r i a l 
c o u r t to keep t h e County employees from t e s t i f y ing about t h e i r f a l l s in t h e 
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Wasatch Manor parking lot. (R. 58, 59). The Motion in Limine asked to 
exclude ONLY testimony of the i r falls. Wasatch stated in i t s Motion and 
i t s Memorandum In Support of Motion in Limine tha t the evidence of p r io r 
or subsequent falls should not be admitted, ". . . because plaintiff can not 
show those falls occurred under substantially similar circumstances and are 
too remote in time from the sl ip and fall alleged in th i s case." (R. 64). 
Mr. Hayes, in his brief and argument, gave the court the impression 
tha t th is case was one where there would be testimony from Wasatch about 
the i r act ivi t ies and the specific conditions on the night of February 9, 
1985, much the way one would expect the testimony to go in a standard 
sl ip and fall case. He failed to inform the t r i a l court tha t the Wasatch 
employees did not have specific recollection of the parking lot conditions or 
the i r specific acts on the night of the fall and tha t they would be relying 
on testimony of "routine.11 He failed to inform the tried court tha t said 
routine was claimed to have begun in 1984 and claimed to have continued 
through to the t r i a l . (R. 466 at 36, 37). 
In said hearing Mr. Bjorklund's oral recitation of the anticipated 
testimony at t r i a l was squarely accurate. (Appendix C). Mr. Bjorklund 
indicated tha t Erickson would testify of the freeze/thaw dangerous 
condition and his fall. Wasatch would defend by claiming a routine which 
has lasted from 1984 to the p resen t Mr. Bjorklund urged that the ladies ' 
fal ls during the time of the claimed "routine" would be admissible because 
they would show that, i t was more l ikely that there was an on-going 
dangerous condition. Second, the i r falls showed that i t was less l ikely tha t 
Wasatch did i t s claimed routine. (R. 444 at 13-16). 
Mr. Hayes1 oral response inferred that no depositions of his cl ients 
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had taken p lace and he i n f e r r e d t h a t Mr. Bjorklund's expec t a t i ons about t h e 
test imony of Kersey and Miller were t he re fo re only conjec ture : 
J u s t two i tems, your Honor. Number one, counsel t e l l s us 
t h a t t he evidence t h a t we have ind ica ted di f fers from what we 
have r ec i t ed . The counse l has r e c i t e d what my people wi l l say 
or not say. There i s no depos i t ion testimony. So I don' t know 
how he can say, based upon a record . He can say based on 
what he expec t s wi l l be t he case. 
I have r e c i t e d and pointed to in our memorandum t h e 
deposi t ion test imony. I don't know of any other . I come to 
the court a t t h i s point knowing only what testimony there is. 
(R. 444 a t 17). Emphasis added. 
The depos i t ions of Mr. Miller and Mr. Kersey had t aken p lace in 
February of 1987. Both Mr. Hayes and Mr. Bjorklund were p r e s e n t , bu t 
n e i t h e r counse l could subsequent ly loca te t he cour t r e p o r t e r who t r a n s c r i b e d 
t h e depos i t ions and t h e r e p o r t s were never produced. (R. 446 a t 6). Mr. 
Hayes' in fe rence t h a t Mr. Bjorklund's comments were simply con jec tu re was 
no t accura te . 
Mr. Bjorklund attempted to c o r r e c t t he misimpression given by Mr. 
Hayes' comments, bu t t h e Court would not allow any f u r t h e r comment.Jl/ 
(R. 444 a t 19). The c o u r t g ran ted Wasatch's Motion in Limine. (R. 444 a t 
19-22). 
1/ At R. 444 a t page 19, l i n e 13 i t mistakenly s t a t e s , "MR. HAYES." I t 
should show "MR. BJORKLUND" which i s c l ea r from the cour t ' s comments. 
Mr. Bjorklund had two o the r motions t h a t day. (R. 89-90, R. 93-94). Mr. 
Hayes made no a t tempt t o c o r r e c t h i s missta tement 
17 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Wasatch obtained an Order in Limine by a misstatement and an 
omission of material facts to the cour t Wasatch could not reasonably 
expect the court to enforce the Order in Limine when the court became 
aware of the actual facts. Ms. Medcalf, co-counsel for Wasatch, admitted 
that they expected tha t the women would be able to test ify regarding the i r 
falls if testimony about the condition of the lot was submitted. They knew 
such testimony would be submitted. Mr. Hayes1 conduct during cross 
examination was not consistent with a befuddled and surprised attorney. He 
was not surprised. 
The claimed surpr i se could have been avoided by Wasatch by (1) not 
misstating and omitting facts to the court in obtaining the Order in Limine, 
(2) asking further questions during the deposition of the witnesses, and (3) 
talking to the witnesses before t r i a l . 
Mr. Bjorklund did not t ry to ambush Wasatch. Erickson had no choice 
but to wait un t i l after Mr. Kersey testified at t r i a l , to ra i se i t s Motion to 
Reconsider the Order in Limine, so the t r i a l judge could hear Kersey's 
testimony with his own ears . Mr. Bjorklund did not refuse to t e l l the court 
what the ladies from the county would say. Mr. Bjorklund explained to the 
court tha t they were rebut ta l witnesses and Mr. Bjorklund was uncertain as 
to what Kersey and Miller would say. Moreover, Wasatch had received 
specific written notice tha t the ladies from the county would test ify and 
tha t t he i r testimony would generally relate to the condition of the l o t 
The testimony of Mrs. Helms and Mrs. Christensen was in the nature 
of rebut ta l to Mr. Kersey's claim that no one had ever told him tha t they 
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had fa l len . I t i s t h e r e f o r e admissible, notwi ths tanding any claim of 
s u r p r i s e . 
The test imony of t h e county employees so t o t a l l y decimated t h e 
c r e d i b i l i t y of Mr. Kersey and Mr. Miller t h a t t he j u r y would have r u l e d in 
Er ickson 's favor notwi ths tanding t h e l imited and benign test imony of Helms 
and Chr i s tensen r ega rd ing t h e i r f a l l s . 
Wasatch cannot a r t i c u l a t e a p l aus ib l e way t h a t a r e t r i a l would he lp i t 
p rove a negat ive , i.e., t h a t Helms and Chr is tensen never f e l l o r t h a t t h e y 
neve r to ld Kersey about t h e i r f a l l s . 
Mr. Hayes chose no t to objec t to or move to s t r i k e any of t h e 
evidence rega rd ing f a l l s . Wasatch does not claim t h a t the admission of t h e 
evidence of f a l l s i s "plain e r ro r . " A subs t an t i a l por t ion of t he evidence of 
f a l l s was so l i c i t ed by Mr. Hayes on cross-examinat ion, even when Mr. 
Bjorklund had no t r a i s e d t h e i s s u e on d i r e c t examination. 
I n s t r u c t i o n No. 20 i s a c o r r e c t s tatement of t he law for dangerous 
condi t ions which a r e neg lec ted by l and lords and Wasatch's Point I I of i t s 
Corrected Brief i s f r ivo lous and misleading. 
This appea l has no l ike l ihood of success . I t mi scha rac te r i zes t h e fac t s 
and law. I t i s f r ivo lous and i s cons t i tu ted for delay. Mr. Erickson i s 
pover ty s t r i cken . Erickson i s e n t i t l e d to a t to rney ' s fees and sanc t ions . 
POINT I 
THE ORDER IN LIMINE WAS BASED ON INCORRECT FACTS 
The t r i a l cou r t would have l i k e l y denied t he motion in limine, had the 
t r i a l cou r t unders tood c o r r e c t l y t he evidence which would be p r e s e n t e d a t 
t r i a l . I t i s noteworthy t h a t t h e fac tua l p r e s e n t a t i o n of Mr. Bjorklund to 
t h e t r i a l cou r t du r ing t h e arguments about t he Motion in Limine, a c c u r a t e l y 
19 
reflected the facts as they unfolded during the t r i a l . (Appendix C). 
Mr. Hayes also understood the actual nature of the testimony tha t 
would be presented at t r i a l . In his opening statement to the jury he 
indicated tha t they should have, " . . . empathy with these people in t ry ing 
to think back to something tha t you did in February of 1985 and being 
absolutely exactly sure, unless by habit, by custom, tha t was your routine 
and that was your life." (R. 445 at 22). Emphasis added. 
Mr. Hayes detailed Mr. Kersey's "routine" for the jury, (Id. at 24, 25). 
pointing to Erickson's probable attack on Mr. Kersey's routine and 
indicating i t was, "probably the central issue of the case." (Id. a t 26, 27). 
Mr Hayes' view of the case in his opening statement, as one focused on 
Kersey's "routine" i s in stark contrast to his arguments in the Motion in 
Limine arguments three months ear l ie r where he discredited Mr. Bjorklund's 
description of the "routine" issue and focused the court on a single 
occurrence. 
Mr. Hayes made another material misstatement during the Motion in 
Limine Arguments when he indicated to the t r i a l court tha t none of the 
women's fal ls occurred in the depressed area of the l o t (R. 433 at 10, 11). 
He urged from th i s misstatement, tha t the falls were so dissimilar as to not 
be admissible. In fact, Mrs. Christensen and Mrs. Helms had each indicated 
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in the i r depositions tha t they had a fall in the depression area during the 
time of Mr. Kersey's routine. 2/ 
Wasatch has made the same misstatement, about the falls not occurring 
in the depressed area, to th i s court in i t s docketing statement a t page 3. 
Mr. Bjorklund thereafter mailed to Masuda Medcalf, co-counsel for Wasatch, 
a l e t t e r indicating concern with th is continued misstatement and other 
misstatements in the docketing statement. (Appendix D). Mr. Bjorklund 
even referred her to the specific page of Mrs. Helms' deposition where 
2/. Mr. Hayes stated to the t r i a l court during the oral argument of the 
Motion In Limine, "Unequivocally, none of these women when I took the i r 
depositions claimed tha t they fell in an area that they described as an area 
of depression in the parking lot." (R. 433 at 10, 11). Mrs. Helms was 
unsure of the year she fell but estimated i t to be in 1986, during a period 
tha t Kersey claimed he had followed his routine. (R. 441 at 9; R. 446 at 
36). She identified her car as the "sage" or green buick which i s in the 
second parking s ta l l from the end on the south side (left side) of picture 
#2 of Exhibit #1 of her deposition. (Id. at 6). She indicated tha t her fall 
occurred, "Right behind my car where i t ' s parked in that picture." (Id. at 
10). Mr. Bjorklund asked, "Okay, so i t was typical to find black ice down 
tha t depression? She answered, "It was, and this was where we fell, was in 
tha t area there." He asked, "In that par t icular depression?" She 
responded, "Yes, and the other time I fell here." Mr. Bjorklund sought 
clarification, "Now, when you f i r s t pointed to where you fell you pointed 
r ight behind your car? She affirmed, "Right, i t was behind my car." (Id. 
a t 27). 
Mrs. Christensen test i f ied in her deposition that her 1984-85 fal l 
occurred, "right near the door" (R. 438 at 8). "Still in the parking lot. 
Now, when I say near the door, I don't mean direct up to the door but I 
mean opening to the door." (Id. at 9). "I know I stayed close to the cars 
because I held onto the cars. (Id. at 10). Mr. Bjorklund asked, referr ing to 
a car parked along the west edge of the parking lot in Exhibit #1 of Mrs. 
Christensen's deposition, "Now, when you fell a second time, was i t 
somewhere in the area of tha t si lver car?" She responded, "Somewhere in 
the area of it , yes." (Id. a t 16). The car was identified at being 1 1 / 2 
inches from the r igh t side of picture #2 of Exhibit #1. (Id. at 15, 16). 
Looking at said picture one can see that her fall would be in the area of 
the dark line which were indicated by two arrows. The dark l ine i s the 
lowest point of the depressed area and was a water stain. (Id. a t 9). See 
also R. 190 and Plaintiff's Exhibit #3. 
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Helms acknowledged her fall was in the depressed area. Notwithstanding 
Mr. Bjorklund's le t ter , th i s misstatement was made again to th is court in 
Wasatch's Corrected Brief a t page 20. 
After the judge had a chance to hear Mr. Kersey's testimony a t t r i a l 
with his own ears, Erickson moved the t r i a l court to reconsider the motion 
in limine. (R. 184-194). The difference between the facts which were 
represented to obtain the Order in Limine and the actual character of the 
case were apparent to the court. In ruling on the motion to reconsider the 
judge stated, "And I don't think that when you ask me to reconsider a 
motion in limine, I don't think i t goes to the motion in limine which I 
heard." (R. 446 at 55). 
Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides tha t relevant 
evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact tha t i s of consequence more or less probable than i t would be without 
the evidence. Had the court understood that certain falls occurred during 
the time period tha t Mr. Kersey claimed he did his routine and occurred in 
the same depressed airea of the lot as Mr. Erickson's fall, the court may 
have well ruled i t was admissible as having a tendency to show tha t i t was 
more l ikely tha t there existed an on-going dangerous condition in the 
depressed area and, more importantly, that i t was less l ikely tha t Mr. 
Kersey performed his claimed routine. 
At t r i a l , Mr. Bjorklund did not ask the court to reconsider the Order 
in Limine regarding Mrs. Mark. (R. 185). Her fall did not occur in the 
depressed area and in tha t sense could have been considered too dissimilar 
to be relevant. At t r i a l , Mr. Bjorklund did not ask her about her fall. 
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At t r i a l , Helms' and Chr i s tensen ' s claim of having fa l l en became 
admissible for an add i t i ona l reason. Their claim t h a t they had to ld Mr. 
Kersey of t h e i r f a l l s d i r e c t l y rebu t ted h i s testimony t h a t no one had to ld 
him of a fa l l . The l a d i e s communications to Mr. Kersey about t h e i r f a l l s 
was not known t o e i t h e r counsel , however, a t the time of t h e arguments 
r ega rd ing the motion in limine. 
Wasatch's Order in Limine was obtained by a misstatement of t h e fac t s 
of the case to t h e c o u r t Wasatch cannot now claim to have reasonab ly 
r e l i e d on an Order obta ined through misstatements and omissions. 
POINT II 
WASATCH WAS NOT SUBJECTIVELY SURPRISED AT TRIAL 
By affidavit , counse l for Wasatch acknowledged t h a t t h e y should have 
known to expec t t h e admission of test imony from Helms and Chr i s ten sen 
about fa l l s . Moreover, t h e conduct of counsel for Wasatch was no t 
c o n s i s t e n t with h i s claim of ac tua l s u r p r i s e . 
In t he a f f idav i t of Masuda Medcalf, a t tached to Wasatch's memorandum 
in suppor t of i t s Motion for a New Tria l , she s ta ted tha t , "Defendant's 
counsel a l so recognized t h a t if they were to e l i c i t any test imony from o ther 
Wasatch Manor r e s i d e n t s t o t h e effect t h a t t he pa rk ing condi t ions a t 
Wasatch Manor du r ing t h e 1984-1985 winter were safe, t h i s would open the 
door t o the test imony of t h e County employees." (R. 315, 316). 
Of course , i t i s no t t h e iden t i ty of the wi tnesses such as Wasatch 
Manor r e s i d e n t s o r county employees t h a t would make t h e tes t imony of the 
l a d i e s f a l l s admissible . I t i s t he testimony about Kersey's r o u t i n e and the 
condi t ions of t h e p a r k i n g l o t dur ing the 1984-1985 winter , t h a t makes the 
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ladies testimony of fal ls admissible. As Mr. Hayes stated in his opening 
statement to the jury, th i s would be the central issue of the case. 
At best, counsel for Wasatch must concede that they had jus t not 
thought through the anticipated testimony well. At worst, Ms. Medcalf's 
statement i s a frank acknowledgement that Wasatch knew tha t when the 
court became aware of the i r "routine" defense, (which was inevitable) the 
testimony of the ladies falls would become admissible. 
When Mrs. Helms and Mrs. Christensen testified about the i r falls , Mr. 
Hayes did not appear to be a befuddled and surprised attorney. After Mr. 
Hayes elicited on cross examination from Mrs. Mark tha t she had fallen, he 
immediately began to question her regarding the weather in November of 
1984 and introduced "the pre-marked weather report for November 1984 as 
Defendants Exhibit No. 27. (R. 446 at 109). In Mr. Hayes' closing 
argument to the jury he urged tha t the weather report showed tha t the 
temperature never got low enough in November for the lo t to freeze as 
Mrs. Mark claimed. (Id. a t 176, 177). If Mr. Hayes did not subjectively 
expect to talk with Mrs. Mark at t r i a l about her fall, why did he have the 
November 1984 Exhibit marked and ready for submission? I t had no other 
probative or re levant use at the t r i a l . 
Moreover, Mr. Hayes had subpoenaed Mrs. Beck, a county employee, to 
the t r i a l . She could have only test if ied about her fall and the condition of 
the lot. If Mr. Hayes did not expect that Erickson would be able to 
present evidence of the other falls, why did he subpoena Mrs. Beck? 
Note also tha t when Mrs. Christensen and Mrs, Helms were c ross -
examined by Mr. Hayes, he knew exactly what points to cross examine them 
on in the i r depositions. (R. 446 at 69, 73, 74, 75, 76, 81, 92, 95, 98, 99, 
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100). He did not r e q u e s t a r e c e s s or e x t r a time to organize h i s thoughts . 
He was prepared . Promptly, he thoroughly c ross examined t h e s e two 
witness , po in t ing ou t eve ry d e t a i l where t h e i r t r i a l test imony about t h e i r 
f a l l s was not c o n s i s t e n t with h i s unders tanding of t h e i r depos i t i ons . 
Admittedly, t h i s might simply be an indica t ion of Mr. Hayes e x c e l l e n t 
p r epa ra t i on for any even tua l i t y a t t r i a l . However, i t does no t seem 
c o n s i s t e n t with t h e claim of genuine s u r p r i s e . 
POINT I I I 
COUNSEL FOR WASATCH COULD NOT HAVE BEEN REASONABLY SURPRISED 
In t he argument r e g a r d i n g the Motion in Limine, Mr. Bjorklund 
ind ica ted t h a t Helms and Chris ten sen had come to t h e i r depos i t ion without 
any p repa ra t ion for t h e sub jec t matter or ques t ions which would be asked 
them. (R. 444 a t 16, 17). Nei ther Mr. Bjorklund or Mr. Hayes had t a lked 
with these women before t h e i r depos i t ions . Their depos i t ions (R. 438, 441) 
showed t h e i r u n c e r t a i n t y in remembering the speci f ics of t h e i r f a l l s . 
Mrs. Chr i s tensen remembered in h e r deposi t ion test imony t h a t h e r f a l l 
occur red "between 1984-1985". At t r i a l she specif ied t h a t h e r f a l l occur red 
in January of 1985. (R. 446 a t 87). Mrs. Helms i n i t i a l l y ind ica t ed in h e r 
deposi t ion test imony t h a t she could not remember the spec i f ic y e a r of h e r 
most r e c e n t fa l l , bu t upon Mr. Hayes suggest ion t h a t i t might have been 
1986, she s ta ted i t was in 1986. At t he t r i a l she ind ica ted h e r f a l l was in 
December of 1984 or January or February of 1985. (R. 446 a t 64). 
Given the u n c e r t a i n t y of t he se l ad i e s in t h e i r depos i t ion tes t imonies i t 
i s only reasonab le t o expec t t h a t they could re f resh t h e i r r e c o l l e c t i o n s 
p r i o r to t h e i r t e s t imonies a t t r i a l . Their improved spec i f i c i ty i n 
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remembering dates does not indicate a "total contravention" of the i r p r ior 
testimony, as claimed by Wasatch, but only a refinement 
Both Mrs. Helms and Mrs. Christen sen denied that they had "reported" 
the i r falls to Wasatch Manor in the i r deposition testimony. One of the 
most common definitions of "report" provided in "Webster's New Twentieth 
Century Dictionary," Unabridged, Second Edition, 1978 i s , "[A] formal or 
official presentation of facts or of the record of something, as an 
investigation, law case, etc." I t i s reasonably possible from the context of 
the i r deposition testimony tha t when Mr. Hayes was asking if the ladies had 
"reported" the i r falls to Wasatch manor, they considered the word "report" 
to have i t s normal meaning as something much more formal than 
"mentioning" the fal l to the man who lowers and ra ises the garbage. 
Erickson has reci ted in the factual recitation of th i s brief, the 
passages where t h i s subject was discussed in the ladies' depositions. Pages 
13, 14 and 15 herein. Also attached to th is brief as Appendix E, are Mr. 
Hayes1 cross examinations of these ladies regarding th is same issue. 
Erickson has underlined the use of the word "report" as opposed to other 
words used by the ladies to describe the i r communication. 
Note the tendency to correlate "report" with indust r ia l claims by Mrs. 
Helms. Note also tha t when the women use their own words to describe 
the communications to Kersey they do not use "report." 
Certainly, Mr. Hayes' reading of the depositions to mean tha t the 
women never communicated to anyone at Wasatch Manor about t he i r falls i s 
reasonable and fair. However, i t i s also reasonable to consider tha t he 
might have obtained information from the ladies about the i r fal ls had he 
used a word other than "report" 
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In the case of Anderson v. Bradley, 509 P.2d 339 (1979 Utah), the 
court noted tha t counsel could not claim surprise because an officer's 
statement a t t r i a l was different than during discovery. The Court noted 
tha t the officer's statement was not necessarily inconsistent with the 
officer's pr ior testimony. Similarly, Helms' and Christensen's testimonies 
a t t r i a l are not necessari ly inconsistent with the i r deposition testimonies. 
When Mrs. Christensen explained in her deposition tha t she asked the 
Manager if she could go through the lobby because she was petrified of the 
ramp, i t i s noteworthy that Mr. Hayes did not ask if she "talked" to the 
manager about anything else. When Mrs. Helms said she had commented to 
the Wasatch manor employee who raised and lowered the garbage tha t the 
lot was treacherous and needed salting, Mr. Hayes did not ask her if she 
had "commented" about anything else. He might have obtained the i r 
statements of additional communications regarding the i r falls simply by 
asking more questions during the i r deposition. 
During the argument regarding the Motion in Limine, Mr. Bjorklund 
stated to the court his belief tha t the ladies could substantially improve 
the i r recollection, in l ight of the i r lack of preparation at the i r depositions. 
He urged tha t because of tha t and also because of the very different 
renditions of the potential facts of the case, the court should wait to ru le 
on the issue, to see what the testimony might actually be. (R. 444 at 17). 
In response, Mr. Hayes demanded that Mr. Bjorklund proffer the ladies 
potential refreshed testimony. (R. 444 at 18). Mr. Bjorklund was not 
aware of the ladies improved recollections unt i l approximately two to three 
weeks before t r i a l . (R, 446 at 76). To require Mr. Bjorklund to tender 
testimony, of which he was completely unaware, i s not reasonable. Mr. 
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Bjorklund has no obligation to Mr. Hayes to be clairvoyant. 
In Anderson, a t 340, the Utah Supreme Court held that, "In any event, 
surprise as a ground for a new t r i a l i s only that which ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against" The Anderson court would not allow 
counsel to simply r e s t on pr ior deposition testimony. 
During the argument regarding the Motion in Limine, Wasatch t r ied 
vigorously to freeze into stone, the unclear and uncertain deposition 
testimony of Mrs. Christensen and Mrs. Helms, in hopes of subsequently 
excluding any bet ter recollection of detail at t r i a l . Given the witnesses 
obvious lack of preparation at the i r depositions and Mr. Bjorklund1 s 
statements at the Motion in Limine of his belief that they could become 
more specific regarding the i r testimony, Mr. Hayes did not take the course 
of "ordinary prudence" to simply s i t on the i r deposition testimony. 
Mrs. Helms and Mrs. Christensen are totally independent witnesses 
from the par t ies in th i s matter. Mr. Hayes had as much abili ty to access 
them and ask them questions as did Mr. Bjorklund. Indeed, Mr. Hayes 
subpoenaed to t r i a l Carol Beck, a co-worker of Mrs. Helms and Mrs. 
Christensen. (R. 98, 397). Mrs. Beck was deposed at the same time as the 
other ladies and was designated by Erickson as a t r i a l witness jus t as the 
other ladies. (R. 52, 53, Appendix B). Mrs. Beck also showed the same 
uncertaint ies of memory in her deposition as did the other ladies. 
Mrs. Beck appeared during the t r i a l pursuant to Wasatch's request, 
waited in the hallway and had discussions with Wasatch's Counsel. (R. 397). 
However, Wasatch chose not to have her testify. Mr. Hayes cannot lay at 
the feet of Mr. Bjorklund or the t r i a l court his volitional choice to talk to 
Mrs. Beck before t r i a l but not to talk to Mrs. Helms or Mrs. Christensen. 
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Mr. Bjorklund has no obl igat ion to do d iscovery for Mr. Hayes. 
The wi tnesses did no t t e s t i fy a t t r i a l to anything which Mr. Hayes 
could not have d i scovered by "ordinary prudence" or a simple phone ca l l . 
Moreover, the test imony of Mrs. Chr is ten sen and Mrs. Helms r ega rd ing t h e i r 
f a l l s i s not n e c e s s a r i l y i n c o n s i s t e n t with t h e i r deposi t ion test imony. 
Counsel for Wasatch can not claim to have been reasonably su rp r i s ed . 
POINT IV 
ERICKSON MADE NO ATTEMPT TO AMBUSH WASATCH 
In Wasatch's Corrected Brief, i t i s emphasized t h a t Mr. Bjorklund 
waited u n t i l t h e l a s t day, a f te r Mr. Kersey's testimony to ask t he cou r t t o 
r e c o n s i d e r t he Order in Limine. Mr. Bjorklund had no choice but t o wait 
u n t i l a f te r Mr. Miller and Mr. Kersey had t e s t i f i ed a t t r i a l so t h a t t he 
judge could hea r with h i s own e a r s t h e i r testimony. 
I t i s c l e a r from t h e Court 's comments when r u l i n g on Erickson Motion 
t o Reconsider t h e Order in Limine, tha t , as a r e s u l t of having heard 
Kersey's test imony for himself, t he t r i a l cou r t recognized t h a t t h e case was 
subs t an t i a l l y d i f f e ren t than had been i n i t i a l l y r e p r e s e n t e d by Wasatch. The 
cou r t s ta ted fu r the r , "And i f t he se f a l l s took place, and based on what t h e 
test imony has been of t h e two p r i n c i p a l s of Wasatch manor, i f t h e s e f a l l s 
have been dur ing t h e f84-'85 season, and they were s l ipped on ice , t he 
Court would allow testimony as far as fa l ls ." (R. 446 a t 56). 
Wasatch's misstatements and omissions forced Erickson t o wai t u n t i l 
a f t e r Miller 's and Kersey's test imony to ask the cour t to r e c o n s i d e r t h e 
Order in Limine. I t should not now complain of t he timing. 
Wasatch has a l so a l leged t h a t Mr. Bjorklund refused to d i sc lose t h e 
test imony of Helms and Chr i s tensen to the judge the day before they 
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testified. In response to the Judge's inquires about the testimony of the 
county witnesses regarding the i r falls, Mr. Bjorklund did not simply refuse 
to respond as i s implied by Wasatch. Mr. B^orklund indicated tha t the 
ladies were intended to be rebut ta l witnesses and then: testimony would 
depend on the testimony of Kersey and Miller. The court indicated tha t in 
tha t l ight Mr. Bjorklund did not need to speculate as to the i r testimony. 
(R. 398 and Appendix D). 
In l igh t of Mr. Hayes' representat ions at the Motion in Limine 
hearing, Mr. Bjorklund was not and could not be certain of the testimony 
of Mr. Miller or Mr. Kersey. The county employees were primarily rebut ta l 
witnesses. Their testimony must, of necessity, be limited to the d i rec t 
testimony i t seeks to r e b u t Mr. Kersey could have taken the stand and 
claimed tha t h is recollect ion had improved (there i s certainly precedent for 
tha t in th i s case) and he now remembers the specific conditions on the 
night of Erickson's fall and he also remembers a l l of his specific acts t ha t 
night. The testimony of the ladies from the county about the condition of 
the lo t throughout a whole winter might have become madmissable. 
Plaintiff 's Motion to Reconsider the Court's Order m Limine was 
drafted before Kersey test if ied. Erickson indicated therein, "That 
evidence of the ladies statements to the Wasatch Manor personnel should be 
admitted as rebut ta l _if Mr. Kersey or Mr. Miller claim tha t they had never 
had notice of anyone fall ing or being dissatisfied with ice in the parking 
lot." (R. 186). Emphasis added The "if" unmistakably indicated Mr. 
Bjorklund's lack of p r io r cer tainty regarding Mr. Kersey's testimony. Only 
s l ight changes m Mr. Kersey's testimony could have altered substant ial ly 
the things which Mrs Helms or Mrs Christensen could have tes t i f ied to 
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Of course , t h e i s s u e i s no t if t he cour t was aware of t he l a d i e s 
p o t e n t i a l test imony, bu t i f Wasatch was aware. The c o u r t i s no t claiming 
s u r p r i s e . Wasatch had a l ready been not i f ied in d i scovery t h a t Er ickson 
intended to c a l l t h e s e l a d i e s t o d i scuss the condit ion of t he l o t (R. 52, 53, 
Appendix B) and Wasatch had a l so taken t h e i r depos i t ions and knew well 
t h e i r opin ions about t h e condi t ion of the l o t du r ing winter . 
Wasatch's claims of being ambushed a re not mer i to r ious . 
POINT V 
REBUTTAL TESTIMONY IS ADMISSIBLE NOTWITHSTANDING SURPRISE 
In Board of Education of Sanpete v. Barton, 617 P.2d 347 (Utah 1980), 
a wi tness was allowed t o t e s t i f y as a r e b u t t a l wi tness even though he was 
not inc luded as a wi tness in t h e cour t ' s p r e - t r i a l order . P r io r t o t r i a l , t he 
cour t had ordered t h a t only t hose wi tnesses l i s t e d in t h e p r e - t r i a l o rde r 
would be allowed t o t e s t i f y . The appe l lan t -defendant moved for a new t r i a l 
c i t i ng t h e s u r p r i s e language of Rule 59(a)(3) of t he Utah Rules of Civi l 
Procedure. The Supreme Court affirmed the t r i a l cour t ' s allowance of t h e 
s u r p r i s e wi tness ' s test imony, s t a t i ng tha t , "Rebuttal evidence i s t h a t which 
tends t o re fu te , or t o so modify or explain, as to nu l l i fy or minimize t h e 
effect of t h e opponent ' s evidence." Barton a t 349. 
Because i t i s impossible t o know the exact spec i f i cs of a n o n - p a r t y or 
adverse wi tness , i t goes wi thout saying t h a t r e b u t t a l test imony can be 
p re sen ted wi thout hav ing p rev ious ly l i s t e d the r e b u t t a l wi tness as an 
expected t r i a l wi tness . The pol icy cons idera t ion of ob ta in ing t h e t r u t h of 
an i s s u e i s s u p e r i o r t o t h a t of r e s t r i c t i n g testimony to enhance 
p r e d i c t a b i l i t y for counsel . 
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In S t a t e v. Mora, 558 P.2d 1335, 1336 (Utah 1977), t h e Supreme C o u r t 
h e l d t h a t when a d e f e n d a n t r a i s e s a c e r t a i n d e f e n s e i t becomes a 
" l e g i t i m a t e s u b j e c t of i n q u i r y and r e f u t a t i o n . " Q u e s t i o n s a r e a d m i s s i b l e 
wh ich "seem r e a s o n a b l y c a l c u l a t e d t o b r i n g o u t f a c t s which migh t t e n d t o 
c o n t r a d i c t o r weaken t h e e f f e c t of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n . " When Mr. 
K e r s e y c la imed a t t r i a l t h a t no one had men t ioned t o him t h a t t h e y h a d 
f a l l e n i n t h e p a r k i n g l o t , i t became a l e g i t i m a t e s u b j e c t of i n q u i r y and 
r e f u t a t i o n . The t e s t i m o n y t h a t Mrs. Helms and Mrs. C h r i s t e n s e n h a d t a l k e d 
w i t h K e r s e y a b o u t t h e i r f a l l s was a d m i s s i b l e a s r e b u t t e d t e s t i m o n y . 
When t h e t r i a l j u d g e r u l e d on Mr. B j o r k l u n d ' s motion t o r e c o n s i d e r t h e 
O r d e r i n Limine, h e i n d i c a t e d : 
But I c a n n o t i n a n y way s t o p t h e p l a i n t i f f from g o i n g i n t o a 
q u e s t i o n a s t o w h e t h e r anybody h a s t o l d p r i n c i p a l s of t h e d e f e n d a n t 
w h e t h e r t h e y s h o u l d g e t some s a l t on t h e p a r k i n g l o t . 
I c o u l d s t o p i t i f i t was n o t w i t h i n t h e r e l a t i v e t ime . But i t 
a p p e a r s t h a t t h i s i s w i t h i n t h a t t ime l i m i t . So t h a t i s j u s t a d m i s s i b l e 
t e s t i m o n y , r e g a r d l e s s . And so I c a n ' t do a n y t h i n g a b o u t i t . As f a r a s 
t h e f a l l s a r e c o n c e r n e d , t h a t t h e f a l l s , i f t h e y can be r e l a t e d t o t h e 
t ime and s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s , t h e n t h a t i s a l s o a d m i s s i b l e . 
And i f t h e s e f a l l s t o o k p l a c e , and b a s e d on w h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y h a s 
b e e n of t h e two p r i n c i p a l s of Wasatch manor, i f t h e s e f a l l s h a v e b e e n 
d u r i n g t h e ' 84- '85 s e a s o n , and t h e y we re s l i p p e d on i c e , t h e C o u r t 
would a l low t e s t i m o n y a s f a r a s f a l l s . 
I a p p r e c i a t e w h a t Mr. Hayes s a y s a s f a r a s t h e c h a n g e from t h e 
d e p o s i t i o n . T h a t ' s s o m e t h i n g t h a t h e w i l l h a v e t o do w h a t h e w a n t s 
t o a s f a r a s c r o s s e x a m i n a t i o n . 
(R. 446 a t 56). The t c i a l j u d g e r e c o g n i z e d t h a t r e l e v a n t r e b u t t a l t e s t i m o n y 
". . . i s j u s t a d m i s s i b l e t e s t i m o n y , r e g a r d l e s s . " 
POINT VI 
TESTIMONY OF FALLS DID NOT CHANGE THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL 
E r i c k s o n a g r e e s w i t h Wasa tch ' s s t a t e m e n t of t h e law t h a t i n a d d i t i o n 
t o f i n d i n g t h a t t h e j u d g e a b u s e d h i s d i s c r e t i o n , Wasatch m u s t a l s o 
d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e r e i s a l i k e l i h o o d t h a t a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t would h a v e 
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App. 1989); State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288 (Utah App. 1988). 
A r e v i e w of t h e t e s t imony of t h e w i t n e s s e s a s s e t forth, i n t h e f a c t u a l 
p o r t i o n o f t::l :i :i s b r i e f i nd i c a t e s t h a t t h e t e s t i mony i)f fal 2 s "w h :i : .1 ) w a s e l i c:i t e d 
d u r i n g Wasatch's d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n of Mrs. C h r i s t e n s e n and Mrs Helms 
was a minor and i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l p a r t of t i ie i r testiinony., A d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t 
woi i ld no t 1 :i a / e occi i rred :i i i til ) :i s ::;iase absen t sai d test imony. • ,; 
Contrast K e r s e y ' s claim, t h a t "the l o t was k e p t f r e e from i c e , with t h e 
t e s t imony of t h e c o u n t y employees t h a t t h e ,1 o t was a ] ways icy,. Kersey 
c la imed t h a t he sal, t ed t h e l o t , when needed., r o u g h l y e v e r y 8 t o 10 hours , 
e v e r y day , -. 1: w inter l ong . The c o u n t y employees d id no t s e e s a l t a t a l l o r 
r a r e l y duri ; - -x wi n t e r of 1 984 85. 
How does K e r s e y ; s tc^turicr.;. of such s u b s t a n t i a l u s e cf sal4" and d e - i c e 
or. a l a r g e marking lor. and many walkway-;, s-..uare v*-.th M i n e r s admiss ion 
: : ; : . / \ - ' ~ * v . - . . . •. ; - . . , • ^ / ; , • ; . : . - • . • : , : . i t „ 1 ; „ : 
shew chey . ..::; ev-;.:; p u r c h a s e d s a l t t h a t w i n i e r ? 
Kersey t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e Icr could rot: '~.3ve r^er. i cy y e t C h r i s t e n s e n 
we i ce . :: : *. waj \ . :>. \r TC--; ; t •!';: I-a:\-c i n d i r a i s ^ ene 
c o n d i t i o n c* t h e \ ' :• ~pk>: r h r o u ^ i i o u i Uxe c o u n t y o f i ^ces and Lix&L s u e 
c o n s i d e r e d tl le ,1 o t :""" t i each lei: oui J." 
Kersey claimed he was so c o n t e n t i o u s t h a t he c leared , t h e sidewalk, t o 
1
 * - S~rtr "^J i s t e n s e r v i - - - i n d i c a t e d ^ia*~ s.i. : s idewalk was r a r e l y 
-_ -^ ' ^ . . .-. . . , i . y : o-one V - . * i n d i c a t e d t o him t h a t 
tl ; l o t was ic;. o i t ha 1 _t needed s a l t i n g ! o Ke.r=. was u n e q u i v o c a l l y 
* - " o i i !:„ t l i e t i: e a, c h, e r o u s 
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nature of the lo t and the need to put sal t on the lot. Miller had claimed 
tha t Erickson had told him tha t Erickson was retired, but upon c ross -
examination admitted tha t Erickson had not told him that. 
Even without any reference to the i r falls, the testimony of Helms, 
Christensen and Mark decimated the credibility of Miller and Kersey. The 
testimony of Miller and Kersey was completely irreconcilable with the 
testimony of the county employees. The jury had to believe one side or 
the other. There was no middle ground or shades of grey. 
There are severed other indicators which speak for the credibi l i ty of 
the county witness and indicate the lack of credibility of Wasatch's 
personnel. The county witnesses were independent witnesses with no 
relat ionship to e i ther party. They had no reason or motive to exaggerate 
or deceive. They were not controlled by Mr. Hayes who subpoenaed them 
to the i r depositions or by Mr. Bjorklund who subpoena them to the t r i a l . 
The county witnesses were remarkably strong in the i r unequivocal 
condemnation of the parking lot in the i r deposition testimony, even though 
they had no forewarning of the nature of the deposition or the subject 
matter to be covered. They had not talked to either party or e i ther 
par t ies ' at torneys before the i r depositions. 
Their testimony was consistent with each other even though they came 
from different offices in the County and they had not talked with each 
other about the i r potential testimony in preparation for the i r depositions. 
These are a l l strong indicators of the credibility of the County employees. 
In contrast, the evidence at t r a i l indicated that a very dangerous 
condition had been widely ignored and neglected by Mr. Kersey and Mr. 
Miller during the winter of 1984-85. In th is l ight they had a motive to 
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e x a g g e r a t e u JL-JIJI i t d u UUMI i e-jl.ini'jin i wyii i u.iny f\bise\ u J ' J U ' U I L 1 m e n 
j o b s and t h e i r p l a c e s of r e s i d e n c e were p o t e n t i a l l y on t h e l i n e , 
P e r h a r chr rrc:*- - • ! ' : : ; * . - : nd i ca t i r .< K e r s e y ' s and M i l l e r ' s l a c k of 
c r e d i b l e : , *... - ' . . . . . ' . . \ . :. - .,•„ c r^s i^ . . i a n y o n e e l s e t o confi rm t h e i r 
s t o r y a b c - ' u . e : r rvu--:.-. c : ,. , i v e r s i o n -: ch- c o n d i t i o n of t h e l o t i n t h e 
w i n t e r of . \ :' . / - '- * * • •- .. * :v" r1^- coi in t} emp] o y e e s 
who s u p p o s e d l y d e l u g ^ i ^ : . -. :;,_:.:• ,„L d i e h a p p y and 
s a t i s f i e d r e s iden t s? 
E • -
emp loyees d ^ c u t i_.^ c M i d - U ^ i •-: U . t J^I : o - :rcn:ji^ b e i c i e t i i ^ - . u- 52, 
52, Append!'-; h< f< r .^~-s h'»i tn ld t h ^ *ir ; in ^ r ^ p : n n e r c u m - n t t ; " - t 
En : - o t / , - • r i a l 
Mr ric ' /es r e v i e w e d to- ' m e ^ L . Mr K e r s e y ' s r o u t i n e and s a i c M:\ Ker sey 
would he pciu undcj . a m i c r o s T ^ e i-irm"- * • _/n* •? 4 T al 1 Wasatch 
knew wha t was coming. So w h e r e were "the o t h e r w i t n e s s e s t o suppo r t : 
K e r s e y and M i l l e r r e g a r d i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n of t h e 1 o t and K e r s e y ' s r o u t i n e ? 
C u r i o u s l y Wasatch makes th:i s same poi n t a t • of :i t s Bad ef 
w h e r e i t q u o t e s Mr. B j o r k l u n d ' s comments i n c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t t o t h e j u r y : 
Did we h e a r from, anybody i n 'the d e f e n s e camp a b o u t t h e c o n d i t i o n 
of t h a t p a r k i n g l o t a l l t h r o u g h t h a t w i n t e r o t h e r t h a n t h e manage r 
and t h e man who i s s u p p o s e d t o s a l t i t ? Did t h e y b r i n g anybody from 
t h e i r a p a r t m e n t t o come h e r e t o t h e i r a i d and say , h e y , i t was a l w a y s 
s l a t e d . [How] Abou t d i d t h e y b r i n g anybody from t h e c o u n t y . I d o n ' t 
t h i n k you can r e a c h any o t h e r c o n c l u s i o n but. t h a t t h a t p l a c e was 
a l w a y s i c y , 
'. n t s oi i t t h a t :i t i s 3 i ke ly t h a t Mr B j o r k l u n d ' s 
a r g u m e n t Wd ~> t e r ; j a s a v e :? -l.r* j u r y . However, i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t 
:;^. hyS<\. d -i r " t~ . - f e r e ~ ^ - a n y o n e ' s fal 1 i n t h e q u o t e d comment. 
T *, * id's c l o s i n g a r g u m e n t and 'Wasatch's 
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conclusion about i t do no t log ica l ly suppor t or even r e l a t e t o Wasatch's 
claimed i s s u e of s u r p r i s e test imony of fa l l s . One must ques t ion whether 
Wasatch has ca re fu l ly cons idered i t s bas i s for t ak ing t h i s appea l o r i f i t i s 
purposefu l ly a t tempting t o confuse a l l of the county employees' tes t imony 
with t h e i r test imony of t h e i r f a l l s . 
Wasatch can no t show t h a t i t would be l i ke ly t h a t t h e t r i a l outcome 
would be d i f ferent . The c o u r t did not the re fo re abuse i t s d i s c r e t i o n . 
POINT VII 
WASATCH'S CLAIMED NEED FOR A RETRIAL 
IS SPECIOUS 
The only e r r o r claimed by Wasatch regard ing t he evidence of t h e 
l a d i e s f a l l s i s t h a t Wasatch was unable to ca l l r e b u t t a l w i tnes ses because of 
a l leged s u r p r i s e . Wasatch does not claim t h a t the test imony of t h e f a l l s 
was p re jud i c i a l , in and of i t se l f . Indeed, the evidence of t h e f a l l s may 
have weighed in t h e j u r y ' s mind aga ins t Erickson. They may have l e s s e n e d 
t h e i r a p p r a i s a l of t h e l a d i e s ' c r ed ib i l i t y due to Mr. Hayes' claim t h a t t h e 
l ad i e s con t rad ic ted t h e i r depos i t ion testimony. 
Never the less , t h e only test imony t h a t could be offered by Wasatch's 
t h e o r e t i c a l r e b u t t a l w i tnesses would be that : 
1. Helms and Christensen never fell, as claimed at t r i a l , and 
2. Helms and Christensen never mentioned the i r falls to Kersey. 
I t i s impossible tha t such witnesses ex i s t No one was stationed a t the 
Manor parking lot twenty-four hours a day during the winter of 1984-85, 
who could testify tha t Helms and Christensen never fell or tha t they never 
mentioned the i r fal ls to Kersey. At best, a witness could simply say they 
were not aware of the asserted occurrences and comments. 
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I n d e e :i t he on ] y peop l e ; ; h ::: • ::: :)i:i ] d t e s t i f y i f I I r s Hel ms a nd I li: s. 
C h r i s t e n s e n t a l k e d t o Mr, K e r s e y about: t h e i r f a l l s a r e t h e t h r e e of them. 
They were e a c h a s k e d d i r e c t l y a b o u t t h e s u b j e c t a t t r i a l . Both p a r t i e s 
were f r e e t:<: exa in irie ai id ex: - DSS ex ami ne tb e :i ssi le to t h e i r hea i: t ' s :::: ::)i 1 t e n t 
What more c o u l d be g a i n e d by r e d o i n g t h e t r i a l aga in ; e x c e p t f o r del ay. 
Wasatch ha..: .-:~t p r o f f e r e d any w i t n e s s wi th a n y t h i n g m a t e r i a l t o add t o 
w h a t was si - ^ , -.1. 
¥:\ Ha. ::,-;•;: a v a i l a b l e t, ,-. c i i m a t o l o g i c a l d a t a a:, t r i a l Tr.i. 
j . ; ^ ^ ' , , .", i« . , ,.. ^^ G/L-—ui<*^ ,2 u s ^ c *w*.= ^rpcoaiiOuo •-1 C m ~s t en sen ?^d 
Helms t o poi n t ou t a n y d i f f e r e n c e s in. t h e i r d e p o s i t i o n t e s t i m o n y and ' t h e i r 
t r i aJ tie slid iii DI i;; • 1 I = h ad a 1 sc: s u b p o e n a e d 1" I rs Beck t ::: tiri a ] a s a potc= n t i a l 
r e b u t t a l w i t n e s s b u t c h o s e n o t t o ca l 1 h e r 
Mr. Hayes d i d e v e r y t h i n g h e cou ld do t o meet t h e e v i d e n c e of Mrs, 
Helms and I Irs. CI :i r i s te i I s e n ' s f a l l . Even. a.ssi in d ng 1 le was t o t a ] ] y si i r p r i s e d 
and u n p r e p a r e d , h e c o u l d n o t h a v e done more t o c o u n t e r t h e l a d i e s 
e v i d e n c e of f a l l s t h a n h e di d, \ n t h t h e e x c e p t i o n t h a t i t m i g h t h a v e h e l p e d 
h i s c . ,£>J :. '. , . . . .* Mrs. ! lark a b o u t h e r fa l ] In a n y e v e n t , no 
amour.: of a d d i t i o n a i f o r e w a r n i n g would h a v e h e l p e d . 
The c a s e s h o u l d n o t be r e t r i e d s imply t o a l low Wasatch t o s e a r c h f o r 
t h e mythicaJ w i t n e s s t o p r o v e a n e g a t i v e , Le., t h e f a l l s n e v e r h a p p e n e d o r 
t h e communica t ions r e g a r d i n g t h e f a l l s n e v e r h a p p e n e d . In l i g h t of 
Wasa tch ' s f a i l u r e t o a r t i c u l a t e e v e n one pla i i s i b l e way a r e t r i a l c o u l d h e l p :i t 
d e a l wi th tl: le a l l e g e d s u r p r i s e t e s t i m o n y of f a l l s , one mus t a s k i f Wasatch 
h a s c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d i t s b a s i s f o r t h i s a p p e a l . 
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POINT VII I 
WASATCH FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE 
TESTIMONY OF THE FALLS 
Rule 103(a)(1) of t h e Utah R u l e s of Ev idence r e q u i r e s t h a t a " t imely 
o b j e c t i o n o r mot ion t o s t r i k e " which s t a t e s t h e s p e c i f i c g r o u n d of t h e 
o b j e c t i o n mus t a p p e a r i n t h e r e c o r d i n o r d e r t o p r e s e r v e t h e e r r o r f o r 
s u b s e q u e n t r e v i e w . T h i s r u l e a l l o w s t h e c o u r t and c o u n s e l t h e o p p o r t u n i t y 
t o know s p e c i f i c a l l y w h a t e v i d e n c e i s b e i n g o b j e c t e d t o s o t h a t c o u n s e l can 
r e c o n s i d e r i t s q u e s t i o n s and so t h a t t h e c o u r t can a p p r o p r i a t e l y r u l e . 
Th i s c o u r t a n d t h e Utah Supreme C o u r t h a v e s t r i c t l y a p p l i e d t h i s r u l e . 
S t a t e v. Les l ey , 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983); Meyer v. Bartholomew, 690 P.2d 
558 (Utah 1984); J e n s e n v. Thomas, 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977); S t a t e v. 
Holyoak, 743 P.2d 791 (Utah App. 1987). 
The o n l y e x c e p t i o n t o t h i s r u l e i s t h e o c c u r r e n c e of " p l a i n e r r o r . " 
Utah R u l e s of E v i d e n c e 103(d). Wasatch d o e s n o t claim i n i t s b r i e f t h a t 
t h e c o u r t ' s r u l i n g was p l a i n e r r o r b u t r e c o g n i z e s i n s t e a d t h a t a t r i a l c o u r t 
h a s b r o a d d i s c r e t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e admis s ion of p r i o r o r s u b s e q u e n t f a l l s . 
In a h e a r i n g on t h e l a s t day of t r i a l , w i t h o u t t h e j u r y p r e s e n t , c o u n s e l 
a r g u e d E r i c k s o n ' s Motion t o R e c o n s i d e r t h e Cour t ' s Orde r i n Limine. Mr. 
Hayes s a i d t h a t r e c o n s i d e r i n g t h e mot ion would c o n s t i t u t e s u r p r i s e t o him. 
He s t a t e d t h a t h e ". . . would s t r i c t l y r e s i s t them t e s t i f y i n g a t t h i s p o i n t i n 
t h e t r i a l . " (R. 446 a t 51-53) . However, n o t once d u r i n g t h e who le t r i a l d i d 
t h e words "ob jec t " o r "move t o s t r i k e " l e a v e Mr. Hayes1 mouth r e g a r d i n g 
t h i s i s s u e . Nor was t h e r e a n y a t t e m p t on h i s p a r t t o r e s e r v e h i s o b j e c t i o n 
a s was s u g g e s t e d a s a p o s s i b i l i t y i n f o o t n o t e 1 of t h e L e s l e y c a s e , s u p r a a t 
82. 
In Wasa tch ' s b r i e f , i t a t t e m p t s t o e x c u s e Mr. Hayes ' c h o i c e n o t t o 
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I 
object to the onere i --••:: •' " —- r -" ' 
State v, Johnson, nc~. .
 fc... - A Johnson, the Supreme 
Court held that when a par;,/ haj ~ricr *:i t r ia l m;ved t" -xr lu ie evidence, 
he 11 TIPS no! r ' — * r 
appeal, if the cric;l j;,u^c u a.-1 ui»r ; - ; .J :- . . . .~ci <.. -..- pieci^al motion 
ana the record indicates that an evidentiary hearing was held. 
I :- ' < . - . e pa 1: t j es and ti ie :: : > i ::i 1: t ha;'; ? e 
a~ ipportu . - / r; he.- ihe resumjny or a u.mess, outside of the jury's 
p r e s e n t ^ 1 *: ? . * - hearing respective counsel state their objections 
ioi is posed or the testimony 
given :i • •- :urr car thereby make appropriate rulings to insure that 
errors are ?+ committed when the evidence is given in 'the jury's presence. 
Counsel r . . .* part ies can adjust their questioning appropriately A record 
is "transendee so tr.ai l i e items that are objected to are clearly identifiable 
f :: 1: an ^ ~^ ' 
State v. Johnson, x,~; not applicable to th 3 s case. No evidentiary 
hearing was held or requested in this case, 
ft \ • .- e 
t r i a l o n i i .* : . c ' . : : Eri.-kb..:. and 1.1; o . .::: - . - . impossible position of 
n-t knowing exact': v w~af p f r ^ re rhe re^ori are bpinq appealed f1 ~- I t 
: * 1 . , - . - . . < c i ] 3 : e 
c la imed e r r o r ; Fo. example , a:, t u a l be*;, I s. Helms a:::: Mrs. • n r i s t e n s e n 
v o l u n t e e r e d r e f e r e n c e s *-••; t-- -:- f-.:!- be fo re Mr b~ork ' i : -o had ' =1- ••:*'*" 
UALiJi-iLU-El I I ! 1M It, - : . . . . -. .. - . • . rjLcl 
to Mr. Kersey's claim trial n<r> ci- r.ac ::o. : : c: •.; rail. 
The t r i a l court's rui:r.:: or aixowu'ig evidence 01 one raiis wab subject 
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to Mr. Bjorklund laying a foundation tha t the falls "could be related to the 
time and similar situations." (R. 446 at 56). Mr. Hayes could have moved 
to s t r ike the voluntary statements of Helms and Christen sen with a strong 
likelihood of success. He chose not to. He had a chance to allow the t r i a l 
court to rule on other comments about falls and allow Mr. Bjorklund to 
adjust his questions to avoid issues on appeal. He chose not to. I t i s 
impossible to now know how the course of questioning may have changed 
had Mr. Hayes made timely objections. 
We are left completely to conjecture as to which questions and to 
which ladies ' falls Mi:. Hayes now objects to as having surprised him. How 
are we to know if Mr. Hayes also objected to the testimony he solicited 
about the falls on cross-examination, especially re la t ing to Mrs. Mark who 
said nothing about a fall on direct examination. 
In Meyer, supra a t 559, the Utah Supreme Court noted tha t without a 
timely objection or motion to str ike, an objecting party cannot ra i se the 
issue of surpr ise regarding testimony that was elici ted at t r a i l by the 
objecting party. Wasatch, cannot now ra ise claims of e r ror regarding Mrs. 
Mark's testimony of her fall and her testimony of the falls of others in her 
office. Nor can Wasatch ra ise claims of er ror regarding the new 
information i t sought regarding the falls of Helms and Christen sen during 
cross-examination. 
Mr. Hayes i s an experienced t r i a l attorney who must have recognized 
the consequences of his choice not to even once mention the words "object" 
or "move to s tr ike" regarding the testimony of falls. I t was incumbent on 
Mr. Hayes to give both the t r i a l court and Mr. Bjorklund, the opportunity 
to cure potential ly erroneous questions or testimony as they occurred. 
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Perhaps, , Mr. Hayes d id n o t o b j e c t to a v o i d f l a g g i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y of 
c„ . . s ioLen- , . - " "<5 \T~ . w ... ...:, e x t e n d e d c. -53 e x a m i n a t i o n . : .•:. . Helms .1- . 
Mr.- C n r i s t e n s e n a b c r - h e n f : . - o r M - e i : c r - n c : f^om yrs. Ma.-: -.r.v s • 
. . . s nb rr: ;:. t^ \*^ a t t e m p t i n g n i a x : : : ; - t i r . a l l e g e d damage c .. 5 
c la imed s u r p r i s e . Wha teve r h i - : e a s o ^ -^r .5 c h o i c e , iz. i s n o i f a i r n o r 
In S t a t e v. Mora, 558 r J . 1. . * : :.h-- . ; u . ; : . \ a \ - f 
"Tf th& d e f e n d a n t c h o o s e s a s a ~ ^ r e r of- s t r a t e c p - - - - - -, . - - . 
* ^ _ 1=.; * o r n o t h . . * j a ^ m e , v : ^ n* ^ d , n . 3^0.. . . : r : be 
p e r m i t t e d t . ::^ a., c j c : iac ~_- ;ui I riaim tna+ rhe t r ^ a l c o ~ r c commiuced 
e r r o r . r. ac .-: a " :n~ wi th h i s r e q u e s i . . . .• •. -> '". " - *"* :A 
^.i. .s.- 'c err... u. ccomes compe ten t e v i d e n c e re,-
 w__ p u r j ^ s o s . S t a r k i n g s 
v. Bateman, ' 2 4 P.2d 12 ^ 1A2.Z A ^ n l^Sc Ohl v. Ohl, r : ' - . d 30 
r.ngeL _v_1_ / : d c ? ^ a „ : n a ^ s ^ - ^ _ ._. 
M a r s h a l l , 7 . . ?.2-.i ' >*\: :-, . 
": Ha; fa: l u r e r : rLake t ime ly -" s p e c i f i c o b j e c t i o n s t h.h.e 
a p p e a l . One m u s t q u e s t i o n a g a i n w h e t h e r Wasatch h a s c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d 
i t s b a s i s f o r t a k i n g t h i s a p p e a l . 
- - • - ' POINT IX 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING WASATCH'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
The t r i a l c o u r t h a s b r o a d d i s c r e t i o n in g r a n t i n g o r d e n y i n g a motion 
f o r a new t r i a.l , The t r i a l c o u r t ' s r u l i n g can be o v e r t u r n e d o n l y i f t h e r e i s 
• . '• 4 1 
a showing t h a t t h e t r i a l cour t ' s ac t ion was a r b i t r a r y , or t h a t i t c l e a r l y 
t r a n s g r e s s e d any r easonab le bounds of d i sc re t ion . Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 
197 (Utah 1981); Hyland v. St Mark's Hospital , 19 Utah 2d 134, 427 P.2d 
736 (Utah 1967). 
Wasatch c i t e s t h e case of In r e Adoption of S.E., 755 P.2d 27 (Mont. 
1988) as p rov id ing guidance for seven conc lus ions a t r i a l c o u r t must r each 
r ega rd ing claimed s u r p r i s e evidence, before t he t r i a l cou r t can g r a n t a 
motion for a new t r i a l : 
(1) a c tua l s u r p r i s e , (2) the fac t s had a mater ia l bea r ing on t h e 
case , (3) t h e cou r t ' s decis ion mainly r e s t e d on t he se fac t s (4) t h e 
s u r p r i s e did no t r e s u l t from the moving pa r ty ' s i n a t t e n t i v e n e s s or 
negl igence, (5) t h e motion for new t r i a l was promptly f i led, (6) the 
moving p a r t y ac ted reasonably a t t he time of t he s u r p r i s e , and (7) t h e 
r e s u l t of t h e new t r i a l would probably be different . 
In r e Adoption of S.E., supra , a t 31. To determine if t he t r i a l c o u r t acted 
a r b i t r a r i l y , t h i s c o u r t must look to t h e r eco rd to see if t h e r e a r e any fac ts 
which would tend t o suppo r t t he t r i a l cour t ' s decis ion t h a t Wasatch does 
no t qual i fy in a t l e a s t one of the seven po in t s . If such fac t s ex i s t , t he 
cour t ' s dec is ion was no t a r b i t r a r y and must be sus ta ined. 
Facts e x i s t which would jus t i fy t h e t r i a l cou r t in f inding t h a t Wasatch 
fa i led t o qual i fy under every one of t h e seven In r e Adoption of S.E. 
c r i t e r i a , with t h e except ion t h a t i t promptly f i led i t s motion. For example 
t h e t r i a l cou r t could have concluded tha t : (1) Mr. Hayes was no t s u r p r i s e d 
b u t expected t h e tes t imony of the f a l l s , (2) the testimony of t h e f a l l s was 
minor given the o t h e r r e b u t t a l testimony of t he condit ion of t h e lo t , (3) 
t h e r e was overwhelming evidence upon which the ju ry could have found 
t h a t Wasatch had g r o s s l y neglected t h e i cy pa rk ing l o t wi thout r e f e r enc ing 
t h e f a l l s , (4) Mr. Hayes could have avoided t h e s u r p r i s e by a c c u r a t e l y 
informing the t r i a l c o u r t of the c h a r a c t e r of the case in h i s Motion in 
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Limine, a s k i ng a d d i t i o n a l q u e s t i o n s a t t h e d e p o s i t i o n s of Helms and 
a c t e d - . . . r ea sonab ly zt ,nco.--t . < :.~\ L . ^ e- L.. I - e\ . *- . c - c: t i .e : a l - s , 
a : : j (~ tha* \ h e t ^ s t i n o r v c * • ~-"ur:y emp 'oyee^ - * *~-i I' d1-ft- ' • --"" * -
C JL cQ.J...UX i.j,,l«.} < i I.i '::; x. o & _j o i L \ i I,M i i i 'c::: J i i 1. c i • \ i i, o ^ j u i 'j w ' i t L < i j i„ ex v c; JL, e; ci i J i, xzz u, i i i„ c: o cm i c 
v e r d i c t , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e l i m i t e d t e s t i m o n y of two fa l I s by Mrs. Helms 
an J. Krs. C h r i s t e n s e n . 
1 !- :'i 'I r« u ' hi<i t jve i j i i.A-41 L '.Uj, / i tn j Wasatch 's iTOti./n f. .r a 
new t r i a l , Lt d id n o t a b u s e i t s d i s c r e t i o n . 
POINT X 
POINT I I OF WASATCH'S BRIEF IS FRIVOLOUS 
• In POII: IT I I of P e t i t i o n e r , Wasatch Manor 's C o r r e c t e d B n e t , i t i s 
u r g e d t h a t t h e ' t r i a l c o u r t committed r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r in g i v i n g "jury 
I n s t r u c t i o n No 2:0. Ii l c red i bl y :i i :i :i t s a rgi lment Wasntrh r in i trs I i >m 11 -
q u o t e of t h e j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n t h e v e r y same p o i n t s of IaTw i t u r g e s en t h e 
c o u r t Moreover , Wasatch f a i l s t o a r t i c u l a t e any b a s i s i n f a c t or l o g i c t o 
s u p p o r t i t s a s s e r t i on t h a t Ii is t r u c t i o i i No 2(3 ::rea t e s " s t r i c t 1 i ab i 1 i,1::y ." 
I n s t r u c t i o n No, 20 was t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s s t a t e m e n t of t h e law r e g a r d i n g 
a l a n d l o r d ' s t r e a t m e n t of a d a n g e r o u s c o n d i t i on I n s t r u c t i o n No 20 i n c l u d e s 
f:i "v e s e p a r a t =J s e n t e i i c e s , eacl I g i * :i i: ig i mpor tax i t mean i ng and g u i d a n c e , A 
copy of I n s t r u c t i o n No. 20 i n t h e form, i t was g iven t o t h e j u r y i s a t t a c h e d 
a s Appendix '- p e r p- rpc£:e:-. r f c l a r i f i c a t i o n , E r i c k s o n h a s s e p a r a t e d t h e 
i i is t rue* . . -
PART ONE: "The d e f e n d a n t h a s a d u t y t o e x e r c i s e o r d i n a r y - a r e to 
ma in t a in t h e common walkways i n r e a s o n a b l y sa fe c o n d i t i o : ' 
t e n a n t s and g u e s t s . " 
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PART TWO: "The defendant has a further duty to observe any 
dangerous condition known to him or which by the use of reasonable 
diligence would have become known to him and to take reasonable 
steps to remedy or remove any such dangerous condition." 
PART THREE: "However, the landlord is not a guarantor for the 
safety of his tenants as they proceed along the common ways." 
PART FOUR: "The mere accumulation of ice does not automatically 
make the landlord liable." 
PART FIVE: "He must be given a reasonable time after the creation 
of the dangerous condition developed, to take such measures as will 
make the common areas reasonably safe from those conditions which 
pose an unreasonable r i sk of harm to the user." 
In Point II of Wasatch's Corrected Brief, counsel quotes to th i s court 
only the f i r s t two par t s of Instruction No. 20, then proceeds to urge tha t 
Instruction No. 20 creates reversible error because i t creates a standard of 
s t r i c t l iabil i ty. Wasatch urges tha t i t creates "s tr ic t l iabi l i ty" because i t 
lacks the same points of law tha t are cited in Parts Three, Four and Five 
of instruction No. 20 and which are omitted from Wasatch's quoted 
instruct ion to the Court 
Wasatch never ci tes to th i s Court that three other Parts of the 
instruct ion were given at t r i a l and that those Parts are exactly the same 
points of law tha t Wasatch i s urging on the court in i t s brief. Wasatch 
attaches the complete Jury Instruction No. 20 as Appendix "C" to i t s 
Corrected Brief but any reference to Appendix "C" i s conspicuously absent 
from i t s argument regarding the issue in Point II. 
In the context of Wasatch's argument the omission of Parts Three, 
44 
F o u r and F ive of I n s t r u c t i o n No. 20 i s h i g h l y q u e s t i o n a b l e . In t h e s e c o n d 
p a r a g r a p h c .f p a g e 31 Wasatch u r g e s upon t h e C o u r t t h a t "The l a n d l o r d i s 
n o t an i n s u r e r of ' the s a f e t y of h i s t e n a n t s / ' c i t i n g t h e c a s e s of G r e g o r y v. 
F o u r t h w e s t I n v e s t m e n t s , 754 P.2d 89, 91 (Utah App. 1988) and S c h o f i e l d v. 
Kjinzell, 29 >"t~ah ^l 42 J 511 P,2(i 149 1 51 (Utah 1 9 1 3) Th i s i s si rap] y a 
r e s t a t e m e n t of P a r t T h r e e of t h e I n s t r u c t i o n . 
C:. pac* ._ ; : :;.s . o r recxe . i b r i e r , Wasatch u r g e s t h e Czi.s\ " . ia \ l ; e 
mere * • -r 1 
l i a b l e , he .s\ r t g i \ r.: a r e a s o n a b l e t ime a f t e r u.-= szo~ n a s e a ^ ^ a co 
r emo\ •= t h e -. - j u m u l a t i o n s '. : taxe srcv. measure:-, as w:-.. i r ak- t h e 
comm * - / . . . - . n 
u n r e a s c n a h r „ : s . cf r.ann r : t*..-- u s e r 1 r u i n g Schof ie ld , a : .-, Th' s q u o t e 
i s a r e s t a t e m e n t cf ?a v^s, ~^ - - •**- ~: In s t ruc t ! ' ^ \^ ~{ 
Next; W a s a tcl i coi IC ,1 ucles t i la I: Par t Tw o of ti le :i i is in: nc t ioi i c r e a t e s 
s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y b e c a u s e of t h e q u o t e s from Gregory and Schof ie ld / i n f e r r i n g 
t h a t t h e t r i a,3 C o u r t had o v e r l o o k e d t h o s e p o i n t s of t h e law. Wasa tch t h e n 
u r g e s t h a t 'the c o r r e c t s t a t e m e n t of t h e law i s t h a t , "" , i n ...... -r t o 
r e c o v e r , t h e p l a i n t i f f mus t d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t d e f e n d a n t knew, o r .... ::.ne 
e x e r c i se of i)i:d i na i: ] r ca r e si IOI i ] d ha/v e ki ic»"V\ i i t h a t a d a n g e r c i is : Dnd i t :i on 
e x i s t e d and t h a t s u f f i c i e n t '"time had e l a p s e d t o t a k e c o r r e c t i v e a c t i o n . " 
Compare Wasa tch ' s u r g e d s t a t e m e n t of t h e law t o P a r t Two of 
I n s t r i i c t 1 oi i N ::: 20 vi t h a si rni 1 a r p r e f a c e . li i o r d e r I: :> r e c o v e r t h e 
p l a i n t i f f mus t d e m o n s t r a t e tha*.. ike d e f e n d a n t f a i l e d ". :• ^ o s e r v e any 
d a n g e r o u s c o n d i t i o n known t o him o r which by t h e u s e of r e a s o n a b l e 
d i l i g e n c e would h a v e become known t o hin t, ai id t o t a k e r e a s o n a b ] e s t e p s t o 
remedy o r remove any s u c h d a n g e r o u s cond i t i on . " Emphasis added. When 
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one adds the further clarif ications of Part Five of Instruction No. 20, 
indicating that the landlord must have time to correct the condition, one 
cannot find a re levant and substantive distinction between Wasatch's urged 
statement of the law and Instruction No. 20. 
One i r re levant difference between the two statements i s tha t one 
refers to "ordinary care" as the objective standard for knowledge and the 
other refers to "reasonable diligence". Wasatch does not mention th i s in 
i t s arguments, however, and i t i s not an issue because Wasatch 
acknowledged at t r i a l t ha t i t was aware of the dangerous condition. I ts 
defense was tha t i t took reasonable actions to cure the dangerous condition. 
Perhaps, however, Wasatch i s urging tha t the standard of "reasonable 
diligence" equals "s t r ic t l iability." This i s quite a leap without providing 
even one ounce of logic or detail as to how Wasatch would reach such a 
conclusion. 
Had Wasatch cited for the Court a l l of Instruction No. 20, i t could not 
have made i t s arguments without appearing nonsensical or absurd. Rather 
than deleting the argument because i t is frivolous and misleading, Wasatch 
chose to omit most of the instruction in i t s citation to th is court. 
The real rub i s tha t Wasatch made the same par t ia l disclosure and 
frivolous argument in i t s Motion for a New Trial. (Appendix G). Erickson 
responded by pointing out to the t r i a l court the inappropriateness and 
nonsensical nature of Wasatch's argument. (Appendix H). 
Although not stated in Wasatch's brief (for obvious reasons), the 
effect of Wasatch's argument i s to ask th is court to directly overturn the 
Utah Supreme Court case of Cornwell v. Barton, 422 P.2d 663 (Utah 1967). 
In the Cornwell case the Plaintiff, a tenant, sought damages from his 
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landlord, for i n j u r i e s suffered from a s l ip 01 ] i ce which formed in a 
p la in i i f i '^ ; . .eor ; i.. t h e Comwell case w^s i..at: \. -: .ce cieanec- a dangerous 
condit ion and tha t rhe Landlord wss negl igent in fa i l ing ~c- corr™--: it-
At page • 664 Jorn.vel ,. >: :.=•-,::. ' " ._ -;•-. . •• :" -d, 
"The cour t i ns"tiu.;r:.t-d t;:e r..:r> t r a t the defendant had a iu ty i;c e x e r c i s e 
o rd inary care to maintai n t h e common walkways in a reasonably safe 
ccnid i t ion f< : :i : tena n t s a i id g ties ts , and tha t IT s 1: :tad a fu r the r du by to observe 
any dangerous condi t ion known to him or by use of r easonab le d i l i gence 
would have become known to hi in and fu r the r to remedy or remove any 
such dangerous condi t ion. The forgoing i s a c o r r e c t s tatement of t h e law." 
Emphasis added, The supreme cour t r eve r sed the ju ry ' s r u l i n g in favor of 
the defend/ .,.-•: • e the 1: i :i a] coi i 3 ::t had g:i ;;ren o the r i ristri ict i oris wh :i ch 
•J.«. Supreme J^u::. i nd ica ted were p re jud i c i a l to the Plaintiff . 
Compare the Supreme Court 's language in Cornwell to Pa r t s One and 
I • - : - . . - '•• • • • • • ' • ' ' • - • > . • • • ; • • • . 
The defendant has a duty to exe rc i se o rd ina ry ca re t o maintain t h e 
common walkways in reasonab ly safe condit ion for t e n a n t s and gues t s . 
The defendant has a f u r t h e r duty to observe any dangerous condi t ion 
known to him or which by t h e use of reasonable d i l igence would have 
become known t o him and to t ake reasonable s teps to remedy or 
remove any such dangerous condition. 
The on] ;; > d i f fe rence between the t r i a 1 Coi u: ts li 1 s t r u c t ion I: Ic •. 20 ai id 
' ^
e
 Cornwell language i s t h a t t he t r i a l cour t in t h i s case tempered the 
land lord ' s di ity to remedy a dangerous condition by adding the words 
"reasonable s teps , " Tl: :i i s cl: lai lge was reques ted by Wasa tc 1: 1 ai id grai 1 ted I: y 
the t r i a l court . Er ickson cannot improve on the Supreme Court 's own 
statement from Cornwell t h a t , llThe foregoing [ Ins t ruc t ion No. 20] i s a 
c o r r e c t s tatement of t h e law.11 -
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To j u s t i f y Wasa t ch ' s f r i v o l o u s a l l e g a t i o n s of P o i n t I I of i t s b r i e f , 
Wasatch c i t e s two c a s e s f a r b e y o n d t h e h o l d i n g s t h a t c o u l d be r e a s o n a b l y 
t w i s t e d o u t of them. Amazingly , Wasatch a t p a g e 34 of i t s b r i e f s i t e s 
Co rnwe l l a s a u t h o r i t y t h a t , "The c o u r t i m p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y a s t o 
a l a n d l o r d ' s s t a n d a r d of c a r e t o h i s t e n a n t s . " On t h e p r e c e d i n g p a g e of 
Wasa tch ' s b r i e f , i t c l a i m s t h a t , " I n s t r u c t i o n No. 20 imposed upon Wasa tch an 
a d d i t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n t h a t was e x p r e s s l y r e j e c t e d by t h e Utah Supreme Couirt 
i n Mar t in v. Safeway S t o r e s . " Mar t in v. Safeway, 565 P.2d 1139 (Utah 
1977) i s a c a s e d e a l i n g w i th t h e law of snow a c c u m u l a t i o n s a s i t r e l a t e s t o 
b u s i n e s s i n v i t e e s . The d e c i s i o n n e v e r comments on d a n g e r o u s c o n d i t i o n s i n 
t h e c o n t e x t of l a n d l o r d t e n a n t law, n o r d o e s i t r e f e r e n c e Cornwel l . T h e r e 
i s n o t h i n g i n t h e M a r t i n c a s e which i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i th t h e law e s p o u s e d 
by t h e Cornwe l l d e c i s i o n , l e t a l o n e " e x p r e s s l y r e j e c t i n g " t h e d e c i s i o n . 
To r e a d I n s t r u c t i o n No. 20 a s c r e a t i n g " s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y " i s p a t e n t l y 
a b s u r d . To u r g e t h a t i t i s " s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y " b e c a u s e i t d o e s n o t i n c l u d e t h e 
e x a c t same p o i n t s of law which Wasatch omits from i t s q u o t e of t h e 
i n s t r u c t i o n i s s a n c t i o n a b l e . 
CONCLUSION 
When t h e r e i s n o b a s i s f o r t h e a r g u m e n t p r e s e n t e d and when t h e 
e v i d e n c e o r law i s m i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d and m i s s t a t e d , t h e C o u r t mus t q u e s t i o n 
t h e p a r t i e s m o t i v e s a n d a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s and s a n c t i o n s can be p r o v i d e d t o 
t h e a p p e l l e e . Eames v . Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah App. 1987). 
S a n c t i o n s s h o u l d b e imposed when an a p p e a l i s o b v i o u s l y w i t h o u t a n y m e r i t 
and h a s b e e n t a k e n w i t h no r e a s o n a b l e l i k e l i h o o d of p r e v a i l i n g , and r e s u l t s 
i n d e l a y i n g i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e judgment of t h e l o w e r c o u r t . P o r c o v. 
P o r c o , 752 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988). S i n c e a p a r t y h a s h a d t h e b e n e f i t of 
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one ru l ing; , t h e d e c i s i o n t o appea l s h o u l d be r e a c h e d or: > ^ - F - . c a r e f u l 
cons iderate ::: n b;; !::J:: i€ pa i: t} an ::! c Dtinsel O'Brien v1 Ru.;. 
(Utah App. 198 7). 
The Order \~ ;..in:>i was obtained di.^- :- '!;- Haves ' miss tatements 
.. - . * . . <- : i„ :•: •- • d i m o i i;; i t n :::: ^ 
u r g e s a^ e. ~r and d.-.-s :io*. :: •' '-- p l i i r . :-r: .:: a
 3 f:i: e x c e p t i o n . Wasatch 
fails 4 - *r- --:1 ;J : ^ rr * -L :-ihJ-- w;~" :-- --:*v: -'. ^:.\-". • h e l p i t dea 3 with 
^ . — . e . . , . : * i - . . - . . . , ::1; I d e s t r oyed til: le 
c r e d i b i l i t y :. M. Kerse;. a:, i *-V Mil ler - . _• .verwnelmir.g, even w i t h o u t 
r e f e r e n c e t H e l m ' .••.-•: "hristenser . 's fal.. Wasatch m i " r ~ ,racterized 
*: s r . r ^ c t i c ; - i • :.L-a: j : , . i : r anc i:i. <* court- a:..,i c a s e s a f r i v o l o u s 
a r g u m e n t u : : n s a i d mis c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n . 
It: i v- • • " - ' * . -• r t: t 3 t a k e :! n tc con si derat i on the 
Appe l l ee ' s ; . r .ancia i . c^niiLivi , . «i.ei. cons ider ing the a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of 
awarding a ^ o r n e y ' s f e e s and s a n c t i o n s . Maughan v. Mauqhan, 770 P.2d 156 
(Utah A'i :*"* • v- - • ! . • .sc: n (Append ix I) :li nd i c a t e s t h a t 
a l though hr- nad t i m e l y pa id n: ^ ; ^ n w cc vasatch Manor, h e was e v i c t e d by 
Wasatch Ma:: 'T, a f t e r r/;^ -.ury r : Lei .m h : ? f avor . 
The ev:i dence p r e s e n t e d at: b ::ii a ] si io\ ; ed grapl i:i c a l l y t:l le dev a s t a t i ng 
e f f e c t h i s l o s s of memory and. mental abi l i td .es had upon h i s ab i l i ty t o e a r n 
income. (R :•--•* ' - 7 . r . i ;-^h ,'^+: •- r7~: - >t . r r *• His 
aff ida vl t a , e x c e p t • 
f o r s o c i a l - / . r . v a. : temporary menial jobs. A j r i r port ion of nne 
judgment p r Dvided by t h e j u r y \ /as in tended to compensate Mr E r i c k s o n fo r 
t h i s l o s s of income. T h i s f r i v o l o u s appeal has no l i k e l i h o o d for s u c c e s s and 
h a s s imply ac ted t o del ay t h e i n t e n t and judgment of t h e j u r y . Mr 
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Erickson 's f a l l o c c u r r e d more than f ive y e a r s ago. Mr. Er ickson should be 
granted a t t o rney ' s fees and sanc t ions because of t h e t ak ing of t h i s appea l 
by Wasatch. 
Dated t h i s 19th day of May, 1990. 
Respectful ly submitted. 
Eric W. Bjorklu 
Counsel for 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby ce r t i f y t h a t four copies of t h e foregoing Appel lee ' s Brief was 
mailed f i r s t c l a s s with p r o p e r p r e - p a i d postage, t o Nelson L. Hayes, CAB 
Towers, Suite 700, 50 South Main St ree t , P.O. Box 2465, Sa l t Lake City, 
Utah 84110, t h i s 9 l 9 t h da^ May, 1990. 
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ADDEND* JM 
A p p e n d I x il B j o r k l u n d ' s I e11e i : is:: : I N e ] s on 11 IIa} e s r e g a rd:il i 1 g 
D i s c o v e r y 
A p p e n d i > 1|: El :i : I c Ilk: s : i i" • ' s1 i t a Ill] 2 i 1 s w e j : s I: :> III n t e r r :> g a t ::: i: I e s 
Appendix - Portions c: . 3jorklund's argument at Motion in 
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Appendix A 
Bjorklund's Letter to Nelson Hayes regarding Discovery 
PACE & PARSONS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
350 SOUTH 400 EAST #101 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
(801)364-1300 
LORINN.PACE July 10, 1987
 E R | C w Bj^KLUNO 
W1LUAM 3. PARSONS III
 G . RANDALL KLIMT 
Nelson Hayes 
Attorney at Law 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
RE: Guy Erickson vs. Wasatch Manor Hotel 
Dear Nelson: 
You have previously requested that we provide you with 
the names of individuals that we are aware of who have 
slipped and fallen on ice at Wasatch Manor: 
Becky Helm (County Assessors Office) 
Jody Christensen (County Assessors Office) 
-Ann Erickson (County Assessors Office) 
Colleen Marsh (County Treasurers Office) 
•-Carol Back (County Treasures Office) 
We may call any of these individuals as witness. 
Additionally, we may call the following individuals who were 
individuals working with Mr. Erickson at the time of his 
accident to testify regarding the damage caused to their 
project by Mr. Erickson1s accident and Mr. EricksonTs 
competence after the accident: 
Rick Miles 272-6280 
Stanley Johnson 1-649-6373 
Ken Chytraus 2120 Marwood Creek, Salt Lake City, Utah 
Enclosed are copies of written information of Mr. 
Erickson's regarding the Hotel Suite project he was in charge 
of at the time of his accident. There are several 
architectural drawings (blue prints) that I would be happy to 
make available to you for your review but which are too 
troublesome to copy. 
In the depositions of Arthur Kersey and Burton Miller, 
they indicated that there was a written job description 
provided to Mr. Kersey. You agreed to provide a copy of said 
description to me. Please provide it as soon as possible. 
I have not yet received the depositions of Mr. Kersey 
and Mr. Miller. Do you still have the originals? I would 
appreciate it if those depositions could be processed. 
I intend to file a motion of readiness for trail in the 
near future. 
Thank you for your cooperation in this regard. 
Very truly yours, 
Eric W. Bjorklund 
cc: Guy Erickson 
Appendix B 
Erickson's Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories 
Eric W. B jo rk lund #0345 
At to rney a t Law 
350 South 400 Eas t , Su i t e 101 
Salt Lake City, U tah 84111 
(801) 364-1300/262-9904 
At to rney for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
GUY ERICKSON, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
WASATCH MANOR, INC. 
Defendant . 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO 
INTERROGATORIES 
Civil No. C86-845 
J u d g e Wilkinson 
The Plaintiff h e r e b y a n s w e r s t h e Defendant ' s I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s by p rov id ing 
t h e following Supp lemen ta l Answers to I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s n u m b e r s 37 and 38: 
INTERROGATORY NO 37: What is t h e name and las t known a d d r e s s of each 
p e r s o n you i n t e n d t o call a s a w i tnes s in y o u r behalf in a n y p a r t of t h e t r i a l 
of th i s ac t ion. 
ANSWER: In add i t ion to t h e w i tne s se s l is ted in t h e Pla int i f f ' s p r e v i o u s 
Answer to Defendan t s I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s t h e Plaintiff i n t e n d s to call t h e following 
ind iv idua l s : 
Guy Er ickson 
Wasatch Manor 
Sal t Lake City, U t a h 
Coleen Mark 
700 Colorado S t r e e t 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
Carol Back 
4597 Namba Way 
Sal t Lake City, Utah 
He will t e s t i fy r e g a r d i n g t h e c i r cums t ances 
of his fall, h is hea l th and t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s 
of his fall. 
She will tes t i fy of t he g e n e r a l condi t ion of 
t h e Wasatch Manor p a r k i n g t e r r a c e . 
She will tes t i fy of the g e n e r a l condi t ion of 
t h e Wasatch Manor p a r k i n g t e r r a c e . 
Rebecca Ruth Helms 
1527 South 1900 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Wanda Jo Christensen 
2360 Campus Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Mr. Kersey 
Wasatch Manor 
Mr. Miller 
Wasatch Manor 
She will testify of the general condition of 
the Wasatch Manor parking terrace. 
She will testify of the general condition of 
the Wasatch Manor, parking terrace. 
He will testify regarding the policies and 
conduct of Wasatch Manor. 
He will testify regarding the policies and 
conduct of Wasatch Manor. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 38: Identify each person you and your attorney 
expect to call as an expert witness at trial. With respect to each persons state 
their present address and telephone number, the subject matter on which each 
is expected to testify, and expected to testify as grounds for each opinion. 
ANSWER: In addition to the witnesses listed in the Plaintiff's previous 
Answer to Defendants Interrogatories the Plaintiff intends to call the following 
individuals: 
Dr. Sam Goldstein 
670 E 3900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Jack Redd or o thers 
in Redd & Assoc. Engineers 
925 E. 900 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
He will testify regarding his examination 
of the Plaintiff and opinions expressed 
in the report provided to Defendant. 
He (or others in his firm) will testify 
regarding the construction of the parking 
lot and the quantities of melting agents 
needed to reasonably melt ice on the lot. 
Dated this 1st day of February, 1989 
Eric W. Bjorklund~/ / 
Attorney for the/Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Supplemental Answers to 
Interrogatories was mailed, postage pre-paid, to Nelson L Hayes, CSB Towers, 
Suite 700, 50 South Main Street , P.O. Box 2465, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, this 
1st day February, 1 9 ^ 
(/l/ilA,* 
Appendix C 
Portions of Mr. Bjorklund's argument at Motion in Limine. 
(R. 444 at 11-17). 
COPY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
GUY ERICKSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
WASATCH MANOR, INC., 
Defendant. 
Case No. 860900845 
Transcript of: 
ORAL ARGUMENTS ON 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
* * * 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, JUDGE 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Wednesday, April 5, 1989 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff 
For the Defendant 
ERIC W. BJORKLUND 
Attorney at Law 
3808 So. West Temple, #1D 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
NELSON L. HAYES 
Attorneys at Law 
50 South Main Street, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
REPORTER: SUZANNE WARNICK, CSR, RPR-CM 
Official Court Reporter 
240 East 400 South, #534 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
801-535-5479 
1 they fell in an area that they described as an area of 
2 depression in the parking lot. And to allow that 
3 evidence I just think is inherently unfair in this 
4 case. 
5 And we would ask the Court to rule in limine 
6 precluding the plaintiff's attorney from introducing it 
7 in opening statements, introducing it by witnesses or 
8 arguing in closing arguments these woman1s four falls, 
9 Thank you. 
10 THE COURT: Mr. Bjorklund. 
11 MR. BJORKLUND: Your Honor, we don't propose 
12 testimony of these ladies' falls for purposes of showing 
13 that Mr. Erickson fell on ice. We propose it to show 
14 that there existed a dangerous condition. The facts, as 
15 we think that they will be presented from the 
16 plaintiff's case, I think vary considerably from the 
17 facts that have been presented by defense counsel. 
18 Mr. Erickson in falling in this area, the 
19 thing that he did not recall was the actual fall, 
20 itself. He does recall coming around his car. He does 
21 recall approximately the area he fell. He doesn't 
22 recall the fall, itself. 
23 Ke recalls simply waking up on ice. He 
24 remembers feeling the ice that night as he felt for his 
25] keys. He remembers coming back earlier the next 
11 
1 morning. 
2 Now, his fall was 11:15 p.m. at night, after 
3 the time when the defendant's custodian testified he 
4 habitually salted this area. The next morning he came 
5 out and he did identify the small patch of ice that he 
6 slipped on. 
7 It's true that he did not pay any attention 
8 to the rest of the parking lot. But he did identify 
9 that patch of ice that he slipped on, and he did 
10 identify it in this depressed area. 
11 But it's important to recognize that the 
12 depressed area is not like an inch or a half-inch kind 
13 of hole in the driveway or parking lot area. This 
14 parking lot has a very gradual sloping to a center point 
15 that is very gradual. 
16 And the difference between a slip here and 
17 here isn't that much as far as perceiving what a 
18 depression is or isn't. We are not talking about a 
19 half inch depression where there is a ledge or all of a 
20 sudden there is a hole there. What we are talking 
21 about, this area is lower than that area. 
2 2
 I I would dispute that there is any evidence in 
the depositions to show that those ladies would not in 
that context have noticed a depression relative to this, 
just as he didn't consider this a depression relative to 
12 
23 
24 
25 
1 that. In the context of a hole, true, they did not slip 
2 on a hole in the sense of depression holes in this 
3 parking lot. 
4 The key issue I think is that the plaintiffs 
5 will show that there is an on-going dangerous condition 
6 in the parking lot. The snow is alwsiys piled around the 
7 rim of it, your Honor, and along this edge. And every 
8 time the sun comes out and every time it warms up, a 
9 sheet of black ice covers the whole parking lot, not 
10 this area but the whole parking lot. 
11 Mr. Erickson is going to be able to testify 
12 about that since his observations since this accident. 
13 What happens hasn't changed one wit. Mr. Kersey 
14 testified to it in his deposition, the manager they have 
15 had. What's furthermore, they indicated, your Honor, 
16 that they were aware of its dangerous condition. They 
17 were aware of its on-going nature. 
18 So this is very different from the usual kind 
19 of slip and fall case where you have a storm that comes 
20 in and puts down some snow on the ground. Then you are 
21 going to have to ask the jury, did the landlord have 
22 enough notice of this storm, of the ice that formed 
23] after the snow. 
This is very different. This is ice that 
25] forms habitually, continually through the winter due to 
13 
24 
1 this freeze/thaw cycle. The evidence will show that the 
2 day before this ice was formed there was a thaw cycle. 
3 The temperature went way up to the 40s and went crashing 
4 back down into freezing. And you had everything perfect 
5 for this on-going dangerous condition that all of the 
6 people involved with the defense were aware of and 
7 testified they know existed. 
8 The defense has no one who knows anything 
9 about what they did on the day Mr. Erickson fell. All 
10 they can say is that they had a course of conduct, and 
11 that their course of conduct was to habitually go out at 
12 certain predetermined times every night and sand as a 
13 result of their knowledge of this dangerous condition. 
14 So we have here the plaintiff saying, I 
15 slipped on that night on that ice. He can identify the 
16 ice. It was in the same area where ice forms. It was 
17 in the area that ice forms on this parking lot and ice 
18 forms generally all over this parking lot. The defense 
19 is going to say we salt every time every night because 
20 we are aware of this freeze/thaw kind of cycle. 
21 in the context of a long-term dangerous 
22 J condition, these falls would certainly tend to show the 
likelihood of that dangerous condition. And that's what 
relevant evidence is, evidence that will tend to show 
the likelihood of a crucial, consequential fact. These 
14 
23 
24 
25 
1 falls tend to show the likelihood of that on-going 
2 dangerous condition. 
3 More importantly, when they testified that 
4 they went out and salted every night, all the time 
5 through all the winters, this definitely tends to show 
6 that their course of conduct was less likely that they 
7 really didn't do that. And the key point of the 
8 plaintiff's case is that there was an on-going dangerous 
9 condition that the defendants ignored in large part. 
10 And these ladies' fall in that context is 
11 plenty close. We can identify three falls within the 
12 season that Mr. Erickson fell and the preceding season 
13 which Mr. Erickson didn't fall in but which Mr. Kersey, 
14 the custodian, was still the man maintaining the parking 
15 lots. The custodian testified in deposition that he 
16 maintained these parking lots the exact same way both of 
17 those year; that he has done it all along the same way. 
18 So the thing that the evidence is intended to 
19 show, that, yes, it's more likely that there was an 
20 on-going dangerous condition. Second, it's much less 
21 likely that they took the kind of course of conduct 
22 defense that they are claiming. 
23 Now, with regards to prejudicial, I can see 
24 where if we had a gruesome picture of Mr. Erickson lying 
25 on the parking lot with blood dripping from his mouth, 
15 
1 
2 
3 
4 I 
5 
6 
7 
6 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
that there would be such emotional shock that counsel 
for the defense could not rationally present any other 
kind of contravening evidence to the jury. But there 
is nothing to keep him from pointing out to the jury 
exactly what he has pointed out to the Court today, the 
difference in location, the difference as far as time, 
the difference as -- I guess those are really the only 
two differences there is nothing to keep him from 
pointing those items out. 
And if there is just an isolated one-time 
dangerous condition, then I can see his point. Whereas 
if it's an on-going condition, I can't — I think it's 
then something they need to consider. And if he wants 
to point out how different it was that preceding season 
or that very season, the jury can take that into 
consideration. They are intelligent people. 
Last but not least, I think the Court has 
heard a fairly good rendition of the facts in this case 
between two counsel. The ladies, when they were called 
to these depositions, had not talked with me at all. I 
had not prepared them. I had not asked them to go to 
their diaries. I had not asked them to talk with their 
friends or do anything else that they might otherwise d 
to refresh their recollection. They came into those 
dePositions absolutely cold. 
1 
1 And while itfs true they may not be able to 
2 recall a lot of detail that may change a jury, and their 
3 testimony may be more specific and foundation may be 
4 easier to lay on that before the jury. So I think there 
5 is nothing to keep the Court from making this ruling at 
6 a point in time when the evidence is proffered. I don't 
7 have any problem in approaching the bench before I ask a 
8 lady, Did you fall in the parking lot, saying I intend 
9 to ask the lady this, and what is the? Court's ruling on 
10 this. And I don't have a problem in withholding the 
11 evidence of their falls in opening statement. 
12 THE COURT: Any response, counsel. 
13 MR. HAYES: Just two items, your Honor. 
14 Number one, counsel tells us that the* evidence that we 
15 have indicated differs from what we have recited. The 
16 counsel has recited what my people will say or not say, 
17 and there is no record of what they will say or not 
18 say. There is no deposition testimony. So I don!t know 
19 how he can say, based upon a record. He can say based 
20 on what he expects will be the case. 
21 I have recited and pointed to in our 
22 J memorandum the deposition testimony. I don't know of 
any other. I come to the Court at this point knowing 23 
2 4
 only what testimony there is 
25 Now, if I am getting the suspicion that he 
17 
Appendix D 
Bjorklund's Letter to Masuda Medcalf 
re: misstatements in docketing statement. 
ER J C P / . JB JTOJRKIL ZJJSTJD 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
3808 South West Temple, Suite ID 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
(801) 262-9904 
November 9, 198 9 
Masuda A. Medcalf 
A t t o r n e y a t Law 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Dear Masuda, 
I noted with concern, some of the representat ions made in your 
Docketing Statement. In several factual statements you have misstated 
material facts t o the case. I am assuming t h a t th i s i s because you were 
not present a t the deposit ions and a t other discovery. However, I am 
writ ing th i s l e t t e r to request tha t similar misrepresentations not be 
r e s t a t ed in your brief. 
In paragraph 4 d. of your Docketing Statement you indicate t h a t ". . 
. t h e i r fal ls might have occurred more than 13 years p r io r to t h e i r 
depositions." A review of the depositions and a review of Nelson's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion in Limine indicates t h a t a t l eas t one of 
the fal ls of Rebbeca Helms and Jody Christensen happened in immediate 
proximity to the time period in question (198 4-8 5 Winter). Your statement 
t h a t they could not pinpoint the i r falls i s accurate. Your statement t ha t 
t he i r fal ls (inferring a l l of the i r falls) occurred more than 13 years 
before i s incredible. 
In paragraph 4 d. you indicate tha t the ladies deposition testimony 
indicated t h a t t h e i r fal ls were in areas other than the "depressed area." 
That i s incorrec t . Please reread the depositions. Both Helms and 
Christensen indicated t h a t one of the i r falls was in what I defined as 
the depressed area. See, for example, page 2 7 of the Helm's deposition. 
In paragraph 4 h. you fai l to note t ha t I had indicated to the Court 
t h a t the testimony of the three witnesses would depend on what Mr. 
Kersey and Mr. Miller s ta ted on the stand. You also fa i l to note t h a t the 
cour t specifically indicated tha t in tha t l ight I need not speculate as to 
t he i r testimony. I believe i t i s incumbent on your to provide a fa i r 
represen ta t ion of the whole conversation and not jus t the f i r s t half of 
i t . 
In paragraph 4 j . you indicate tha t Ms. Helms and Christensen's 
aff idavi ts were in t o t a l contradiction to t he i r deposition testimony. 
Pinpointing dates within a two year period can hardly be called " to ta l 
contradiction." Pa r t i cu la r ly in a Docketing Statement, such extreme and 
argumentative statements are inappropriate . Although you may wish t h a t 
Helms and Christensen's deposit ions did not ta lk about a fa l l during the 
time period in quest ion, wishing does not give license t o mislead. 
I will no t stand by and allow misstatements and gross 
exaggerations. I urge t h a t the focus on the appeal ought t o be on the 
issues. Continued misstatements would give me ho a l t e r n a t i v e but to 
make your misstatements an addi t ional issue of the appeal. Making 
accurate statements will make for a much more enjoyable process for both 
of us. 
Sincerely, 
Eric W. Bjorklund 
Attorney a t Law 
Appendix E 
Excerpts of Mr. Hayes' cross examination of Mrs. Helms 
and Mrs. Christensen at trial. 
(R. 446 at 74-76, 98-101) . 
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this fall to Mr. Kersey; is that right? 
A I told him. I can remember telling him, 
yes. That I had fallen and that I thought they should 
do something about it. 
MR. HAYES: I would like to publish the 
deposition of [Rebecca Helms|, your Honor. 
Q Let me show you that, Mrs. Helms. You had an 
opportunity, did you, to read that deposition at some 
point in time and make corrections and sign it before a 
notary? 
A I don't remember that I made corrections. I 
guess. 
Q You had an opportunity? 
A I had an opportunity to read it. 
Q You were told that you could do that? 
A Right. 
Q And I'd like you to go with me, if you 
would, to page 12 of your deposition. If you would 
look just for a reference as to what we were talking 
about, there on line 1 you were answering, 
"A The whole parking lot was a sheet of 
ice. It had probably rained and the parking 
lot seemed to hold the water. And it was 
frozen. As a matter of fact, I remember we 
walked down the in-coming entrance. Rather 
74 
1 than walk through the parking lot, we went 
2 down through," 
3 A That's right. We did. I had forgotten that. 
4 Q We went through talking about it. And on 
5 line 23 I asked you the question, 
6 lfQ Did you report this to anyone, 
7 anybody." 
8 And on line 24 you said, 
9 "A I kind of think I reported it to the 
10 office, but I don't think an industrial was 
11 made up on it. I went on to work." 
12 When you are talking about an industrial, 
13 what are you talking about? 
14 A A claim that I had been hurt. 
15 Q And you donft know if you did or not, whether 
16 you reported it to the office? 
17 A The man who handled the industrial claims is 
18 a very good friend of mine. I'm sure I told him I fell, 
19 but whether anything else was done, I doubt very 
20 seriously there was. 
21 Q Question, this is now on page 13. 
22 A Yeah. 
23 Q "Q When you say the office, your 
24 assessor's office?" 
25 "A The assessor's office." 
75 
1 Then, 
2 "Q Did you report it to anybody at 
3 Wasatch Manor?" 
4 What did you answer there? 
5 A I don't see where you are. 
6 Q Line 6, 
7 A I said, "No." 
8 Q When did you have your recollection refreshed 
9 as to seeing Mr, Kersey? 
10 A Well, I saw Mr. Kersey lots. He was there 
11 ever morning. 
12 Q And so you recognized Mr. Kersey. Not 
13 because necessarily that you had reported to him that 
14 there had been a fall. You recognized him, isn't it 
15 true, because every morning you saw him out there? 
16 A I remember telling Mr. Kersey. And I don't 
17 know which day, or when, telling him they needed to do 
18 something about it. That it was very icy and that I had 
19 fallen. 
20 Q Had you forgotten about that when we took 
21 your deposition? 
22 A I guess I had. 
23 Q Have you met recently with Mr. Bjorklund? 
24 A Yeah, we did. 
2 5 J Q To review what your testimony would be here 
76 
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Salt 
that 
Q 
Lake 
A 
Q 
you 
Have you seen snow piled everywhere in the 
Valley during the winter? 
Yes, sir, there was. 
Now, this particular time that you indicate 
had fell, do you remember whether it appeared 
to you that the parking lot had been plowed or shoveled? 
Mrs. 
that 
A I do not think that it had been. 
MR. HAYES: Could we publish the deposition of 
Christensen. 
Q You have had an opportunity to read and sign 
, haven't you; do you remember? 
A 
Q 
asked the 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes, sir. 
And turn to page 10 with me, line 17. I 
question, 
"Q Had the parking lot been plowed or 
cleared?" 
You answered, 
"A It had been plowed or it had been 
shoveled, I guess. And then maybe it had 
been a day or two or so after the snow where 
the ice had accumulated." 
That was your testimony; is that right? 
Uh-huh. 
Yes? 
Yes. 
98 
Q 
•A 
;
 Q 
understood 
indicated H 
Okay. I then asked you, 
"Q Had it been salted?"1 
And your answer? 
I could not recall. 
Is that your testimony? On direct I 
it was different than that. That you 
that you had memory there was no salt the day 
that you fell. Is that right? 
A 
Q 
I could not remember seeing any. 
And you also indicated the day that you fell 
that you reported that to Mr. Kersey who we had come in 
here. Isn 
A 
I reported 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
permission 
door. 
Q 
line 5, 
1 
!t that right? 
It may have not been that: very same day that 
it to him. 
But you did report it to him? 
But I did report it. 
You reported your fall to him? | 
I told him that I had fallen, and asked his j 
to walk through the lobby and out the front 
, ' . 
Turn to page 11 of your deposition there, 
"Q Were you injured?" 
Line 6, 
"A No more than just a jar." 
99 
1 Question, line 7, 
2 "Q Did you report it to anyone?" 
3 Line 8, 
4 "A I probably made comment that I had 
5 fallen, 
6 "Q To someone at work? 
7 "A Yes. 
8 "Q Did you report it to anybody at Wasatch 
9 Manor?" 
10 Line 12, what was your answer? 
11 A "No." May I say something? 
12 Q Please. 
13 A The reason I don't go around and tell 
14 everybody that I have fallen or I am going back to see 
15 the doctor or anything like this is because I keep this 
16 to myself. This is something personally to me. 
17 And they are not interested in any injuries 
18 that I have had or the problems that I have gone 
19 through. If I could have kept the coma from the people 
20 in the county building, I would have done that. But 
21 when it was life and death to me, they knew. 
22 So I don't go around and tell everybody 
23 everything that has happened to me. 
24 Q Do you recall the sequence of the 
25 maintenance of the parking lot between the years of '81 
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1 when you went back there through '85? Can you tell us 
2 in any particular year whether the maintenance in your 
3 opinion was any better than any other year? 
4 A I was petrified of that parking lot. In my 
5 estimation and my opinion and in my belief, I think it's 
6 a death trap. 
7 Q Isn't it true, Mrs. Christensen, that prior 
8 to this you had even fallen in your own — on your own 
9 sidewalks at your house and broken your arm? 
10 A Yes, sir, it is. 
11 Q You had fallen again running to catch a bus? 
12 A Yes, sir. 
13 Q You were afraid of falling; is that right? 
14 A No. I am not afraid of falling. 
15 Q Did you put salt on your sidewalks when you 
16 fell? 
17 A On my sidewalks, when I fell in my driveway? 
18 Q Yeah. Did your sidewalks have salt on it 
19 when you fell and broke your arm? 
20 A Yes, sir, it did have. 
21 Q Now, isn't it true that at the time that you 
22 fell on this occasion, that you were able to see the ice 
23 in front of you, and you were walking along in the 
24 parking lot and then lost your footing and then went 
25 down? 
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Appendix F 
Trial Jury Instruction No. 20. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO 
The defendant has a duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain the common 
walkways in reasonably safe condition for tenants and guests . The defendant 
has a further duty to observe any dangerous condition known to him or which 
by the use of reasonable diligence would have become known to him and to take 
reasonable steps to remedy or remove any such dangerous condition. 
However, the landlord is not a guarantor for the safety of his tenants as 
they proceed along the common ways. 
The mere accumulation of ice does not automatically make the landlord 
liable. He must be given a reasonable time after the creation of the dangerous 
condition developed, to take such measures as will make the common areas 
reasonably safe from those conditions which pose an unreasonable risk of harm 
to the user. 
2£> 
Appendix G 
Point II of Wasatch's Amended Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. 
Si x til i, def ei idai i l::f s counsel acted reasonably at the 
time that the surprise testimony was offered Into evidence. 
Upon plaintiff's Motion, ;|.;.r Reconsideration, a hearing was 
held, and defendant1?' <*' n:>?l arqued to tin- Coin" f - -" M-H-. 
admissioi i ol such testimony constituted surprise. See 
Affidavit of .Masuda Medcalf at para, 14, 
Finally, the TP?J\ 11 nf t he trial wou 1 d h'-».\ r-« } ir•»• 11 
diffetenn iiriui in HUM in MI I i ni, admission or me testimony or 
Ms. Helms*, Ms, Christensen, and Mi:-. • FLirk A brief Interview of 
two jurors after the trial indicated that the jury was greatly 
influcnc .• b\ iJM-» \ < >sf i IUOHV ni 1 lu ".P v^ hit: :,,. tv. , <MI I I i >' 
v * thout i.ucn testimony the jury would not have been a.d.o to 
enter a \erdict of negligence on the part of the defendant. 
The jurors Interviewed could not understand why the d^ f PIT'ant 
Iv " h' f I " r> " < i " i , disyiletosted L..1 ,dn> , i i Wasatcn Manor to 
testify J ii contradiction to the testimony of Helms, Christensen 
and Mark Because all the factors have been met, defendant is 
entitled L .- a i \e * It:i: ::i a3 
II. THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A NEW 
TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE COURT 
INCORRECTLY INSTRUCTED THE "TRY AS TO THE 
STANDARD C~ CASE REQUIRE? i: - A LANDLORD. 
I"" :-; w. established - - I -i^  + ~*t a ] andlord has 
c r . 3 tl: ie coin in : i I a reas 
i • r e a nab Iv s - *; f rnci^ ' ' c _, , ^ ~. ar4:r ?nd g u e s t s . 
Gregory v . F o u r t h w e s t I n v e s t m e n t s ; Lt -3 . , ** •* P. 2d 8 9 , 9 1 
(Utah Apj , 1 988) ; - . - : i e - . a ._. ^ i r . - e * \;ih ^u >;. , 
- 1 0 -
P.2d 149, 151 (1973). A landlord is not a guarantor for the 
safety of his tenants and their guests. Id. 
At trial of this matter, the Court gave Jury 
Instruction No. 20, which states in pertinent part: 
The defendant has a duty to exercise 
ordinary care to maintain the common 
walkways in reasonably safe condition for 
tenants and guests. The defendant has a 
further dutyto observe any dangerous 
condition known to him or which by the use 
of reasonable diligence would have become 
known to him and to take reasonable steps 
to remedy or remove any such dangerous 
condition. 
(Empasis added). This instruction fails to correctly state the 
law that a landlord need only exercise reasonable care in 
maintaining the premises for the safety of his tenants. The 
second sentence of the instruction creates a higher duty on 
the landlord, akin to strict liability and contrary to Utah 
law. It is clear that no such extra duty may be imposed upon 
a landlord, because a landlord is not a guarantor of the 
safety of his tenants. Jury Instruction No. 2 0 should not 
have been given. 
CONCLUSION 
This case presents a situation of complete and 
unavoidable surprise first because defendant was not notified 
until the last day of trial of the change in testimony, and 
second because the defendant could not have foreseen that the 
Court would rule in violation of its prior Order. Rule 
59(a)(3) and public policy require that a defendant have 
-11-
Appendix H 
Defendant's Motion for a New Tria. 
e >•' e i i i f c o 1 11 1 s e 1 u a s i e a s o i i a b "1 y s i 11 p r i s e d b;;; f I = I I e 11: :i i s a i i d ! 1 s . C) I r I s t e i i s e n ' s 
tes t imony tha t they told Kersey aboi it the i r falls, ^ . , .';. 
POINT VII 
^ . INSTRUCTION I 20 IS A CORRECT STA I EMEN I OF IHE LA - " 
Plaintiff 's p l ead ings and t h e evidence p roduced at t r ia l indicate tha t 
P1 a i n t i f f' s t h e :i) r y o f t h e c a s e i s a s a f f d a n g e r o \ i s c o i I d i t i o n ' ' c a. s e a i i d i I c • t :: 11 I 
"accumulation i of snow" case . The Utah Supreme Court i n the case of Cornwell 
v, Barton, 422 P,2d fir", fir J ( r - ,> pv,~x j P l v ^ - ^ rh^- * • M- - the i :uL, " 
' ' ' reasonable") "is a c o r r e c t s ta tement of the law." 
Ir icredib 1 y, th i 4 Defen dan t in i ts memoran di) m c i tes the Cour i to tI;A o 
points of law about a landlord s "di ity to exercise o r d i n a r y c a r e " and that the 
"landlord is not a g u a r a n t o r " as if to infer t ha t t hese r e in ' - w- r*- overlooked 
~ < o i 1 1 t I I: i e D e f e n d a n t t hi e n p a i * t i a 11} q i.. i o!: e 5 11 I ; 
del iberately omitting said sa.me two points of law fron i " :ie ^ ic 'ed port ion of 
In s t ruc t ion 20. . 
:i f t e i " i i i ( •"; o r r < * < : t ] y :| 11 c : t i i i g c • i I 1 y a p * : »i t i : i i • : • If 1 1 i s t t 11 c t i o i i 2 ( ), 11 I e I) e f e i i d a i 11, 
concludes , wi thout logic or spec i f i ca t ion tha t I n s t ruc t i on 20 c r e a t e s a 
s t a n d a r d of s t r i c t l iabil i ty. The following is the complete text of I n s t ruc t i on 
""he d e f e n d a n t ha.s a d u t y to exercise o r d i n a r y ca re to maintain 
the common walkw rays in r ea sonab ly safe condit ion for t e n a n t s and 
g u e s t s . The d e f e n d a n t ha s a f u r t h e r du ty to o b s e r v e any d a n g e r o u s 
conditi r known to him or which by the use of r easonab le dil igence 
wrould have become known to him and to take reasonab le s t e p s to 
remedy or remove any such d a n g e r o u s condit ion. 
However, t h e l and lo rd is not a g u a r a n t o r for the safety of his 
t e n a n t s as they p roceed along the common ways. 
The mere accumula t ion of ice does not automatically make t\ te 
landlord liable. He must be given a reasonable time af te r the creat ion 
of the d a n g e r o u s condi t ion developed,, to take such measures as will 
15 
make the common a r e a s r ea sonab ly safe from those condi t ions which 
pose an u n r e a s o n a b l e r i sk of harm to t he u se r . 
To r ead t h i s I n s t r u c t i o n as c r ea t i ng " s t r i c t l iabi l i ty" is a b s u r d . It is 
no wonder t h a t Defendan t fails to ind ica te the specif ics or logic of how 
Ins t ruc t ion 20 c r e a t e s " s t r i c t l iabi l i ty" . 
The Cour t ' s I n s t r u c t i o n is a c o r r e c t s ta tement of t h e law r e g a r d i n g 
dange rous cond i t ions in l a n d l o r d - t e n a n t cases . If a n y t h i n g , it f avors the 
Defendant more t h a n it needed to. 
Respect fu l ly submi t ted . 
Dated th i s 5th day of Ju ly , 1989. 
/ 
/ 
//yy-
Eric V. Bjork'lu.jid " ' 
At torney for the Plaintiff 
NOTARY 
On th i s 5th day of Ju ly , 1989 Eric W. Bjorklund a p p e a r e d before m** and 
a t t e s t ed to t h o s e fac t s a s s e r t e d by him in„his above s t a t ed memorandum. 
'<2<rC^ 
Residing at: J^-/f J^S^ t&^ZZj 
Expires at: t/-/-*/z.. 
Notary 
^^£.1-/1 3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I h e r e b y c e r t i f y t h a t a copy of the foregoing p lead ing was mailed, 
pos tage p r e - p a i d , t o Nelson L Hayes, CSB Towers, Sui te 700, 50 South Main 
S t ree t , P.O. Box 2465, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, t h i s 5th day of Ju ly , 1989* 
Append:! x 1 
Affidavit of appellee/plaintiff Guy Erickson. 
Eric W. Bjorklund #0345 
Attorney at Law 
380 8 South We s t Te mp1e, S i J I t i ] D 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411 5 
(801) 262-9904 
A 1 1 o r n e y f o r P 3 a i i i t i f f R e s p <:: n d e n t 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
GUY ERICKSON, 
Pxa . : 
VS. 
WASATCH MANO? 
— ^ t ; 
AFFIDAVIT OF P L A I N T I F F -
^ ;?ONDENT 
{]' ERICKSON 
:8b -8 4b 
i'A 8 9 0 7 3 7-CA 
Guy Frickson, having been first duly sworn, hereby deposes 
as follow.;:) ; 
1 T I: i c -, t: 1 i =J :ii s 1:1: i 3 P1 a :i ] I t :i f f P e s p o n d e n t :i :i I 11 l • = • e t c e 
entitled action. 
2 That after he obtained a judgment against Wasatch 
M a n c r i i i t h = s b c ^  r e e i I I: i t ] e d in a t t e J : I: I 3 ; ; a. s 3 :i 21 3 :i ; ; :i 11 1 o 1 1 1: 
explanation by Wasatch Manor. 
3 T h a t h e h a s n. o t f a i 1 e d t o t i m e 1 y p a y h :i s r e 1:11 t o 
W a s a t c h f Iai 101: si nee n 1,0 i ng I::J: l e r e ai 1 :! t:l: 1a t I "!:i : E21: icksoi 1 :i s 1 11 laware 
of any other facts or reasons for his eviction.; except for the 
spitefulness and vi n d i c t i v e n e s s of W a s a t c h Manor. 
1 Ti 1a t he i s 1 10 1 01 iger ab] e to function as a realtor 
cs a resu t of the i njuries sustained to hi s head from,, his fal 1. 
5 . That 1 ie currently lives i 1 1 the basement • : f a 
111 e n c . 
6. That his income is limited to social security and 
income from temporary periodic employment, such as passing out 
telephone books, helping with the U.S. census for six weeks, etc. 
7. That he has a contingency fee arrangement with Mr. 
Bjorklund. 
8. That as a result of the Appeal of Wasatch Manor, he 
will be paying Mr. Bjorklund a greater percentage of any recovery 
to be made in the above entitled action. 
9. Thab as a result of his poverty, he has been unable 
to pay for the majority of the costs of the trial or the appeal. 
He has had to rely on Mr. Bjorklund to pay most of the costs of 
the trial and this appeal. 
10. That he does not have sufficient funds to provide 
for himself and that he ought not to have to pay out additional 
attorney's fees as a result of Wasatch Manor's frivolous appeal. 
11. That he must rely on the money to be recovered 
from the above-entitled action to provide for his needs now that 
he is not as competent as he once was to earn income. 
DATED this 19th day of May, 1990. 
NOTARY 
Appeared before me Guy Erickson on this 19th day of May and 
affirmed that he is the signer of the above stated, instrument. 
